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BETWEEN TRADITION AND PROGRESS: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON
POLYGAMY IN THE UNITED STATES AND
INDIA
CYRA AKILA CHOUDHURY*

Both the United States and India have had longstanding
experiences with polygamy and its regulation. In the United
States, the dominant Protestant majority has sought to
through
abolish Mormon practices of polygamy
criminalization. Moreover, a public policy exception has been
used to deny recognition of plural marriages conducted
legally elsewhere. India's approach to polygamy regulation
and criminalization has been both similar to and different
from that of the United States. With a sizable Muslim
minority and a legal framework that recognizes religious law
as family law, India recognizes polygamy in the Muslim
minority community. However, it has criminalized it in the
Hindu majority community. Despite the existence of criminal
sanctions for Hindus, the incidence of polygamy among the
majority community is roughly equivalent to that of Muslims
for whom it is permitted. In the United States, despite harsh
measures to abolish the practice, it continues and might even
be growing in urban communities. This Article takes
seriously the feminist critique of traditional polygamy as
distributionally unfair to women. However, it also
acknowledges that polygamy may be an attractive
alternative and an acceptable family form. This is
Associate Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law.
Many thanks to Professors Clare Huntington and Colene Robinson for the
invitation to present this paper at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Thanks
also to Aya Gruber for her valuable comments and to the participants of the
Symposium on Comparative Family Law at the University of Colorado Law
School. Mahira Khan provided invaluable research assistance, and the editors of
the Colorado Law Review deserve thanks for excellent work in the production
process.
*
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particularly true if it is reformed and made to progress as
was monogamous marriage in the mid-twentieth century.
This Article argues that rather than focusing on the
criminalization of a family form that has been in existence
for millennia, a more fruitful approach to regulating
polygamy is to focus on the distribution of rights and
obligations within the family. This approach accepts that
abolition is a goal that is unlikely to be met and that women
and men may choose polygamy for rationalreasons. As such,
feminists are more likely to see gains for women by directing
their efforts toward reform and recognition rather than
criminalizationand abolition.
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INTRODUCTION
To the ordinary person on the street of Kolkata or
Kalamazoo, a question about the similarities between India
and the United States might elicit a blank stare. Indeed, the
two countries are geographically separated by half the globe
and have distinct histories and cultures. India-with a
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population of a billion people, multiple languages, and myriad,
distinct ethnic and religious populations-seems to have
nothing in common with the United States.' India is the land of
gurus, temples, and, more recently, call centers and Bollywood
dancing. The United States, on the other hand, is a modern,
technologically advanced state, comparatively young in its
political history, with a common language and a more
homogenous discernible majority population (though that
majority is changing).
Despite their differences, the two countries share
similarities. Both are democracies, both have large minority
populations, and both were once British colonies. They have
been indelibly influenced by English liberal political philosophy
and jurisprudence. The founding fathers of the United States
were heirs to familiar thinkers like John Locke, Thomas
Hobbes, and Adam Smith.2 It is from these philosophers that
Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, John Adams, and our
other founders drew inspiration to rebel against the British
crown. 3 And, when the time came, it is from the United States'
founding fathers-along with Indian philosophy, tradition, and
culture-that India's founding fathers Mahatma Gandhi,
Jawaharlal Nehru, and Vallabhai Patel drew inspiration-so
much so that the U.S. Constitution served as a model for the
Indian Constitution. 4
Both countries' judicial systems, moreover, are offshoots of
British common-law tradition and share much in their
approach to adjudication. 5 Indian Supreme Court Justices
often reference U.S. case law in their decisions,6 underscoring
both the commonalities and strength of this influence. This
Article advances the comparative literature that explores the
1. See Background Note: India, U.S. DEPARTMENT ST., http://www.state.gov/
r/pa/eilbgn/3454.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2011).
2.

See generally HENRY F. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA (1978).

3. See generally id.
4. See M.K.U. Molla, The Influence of the U.S. Constitution on the Indian
Sub-continent: Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, in THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION: ITS BIRTH, GROWTH, AND INFLUENCE IN ASIA 153 (J. Barton Starr
ed., 1988).
5. See generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (2009); MITHI
MUKHERJEE, INDIA IN THE SHADOWS OF EMPIRE: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL
HISTORY 1774-1950 (2010).

6. See, e.g., Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2011) 4 S.C.J. 637 (India)
(referencing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951));
Narayan Dutt v. State of Punjab, (2011) 3 S.C.J. 845 (India) (referencing Exparte
Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307 (1855)).
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challenges that both family law systems face as they progress
through the new millennium. While one could write several
books comparing7 India and the United States, the constraints
of space in this Article require a much more limited inquiry. As
such, I restrict myself to the one overarching tension that
pervades both Indian and U.S. family law systems at both
federal and state levels: the conflict between traditional
religious values and secular law in the practice and regulation
of polygamy.
Polygamy has evoked strong reactions in both countries. It
is often described as regressive, patriarchal, abusive, and even
barbaric.8 Women's rights groups are opposed to polygamy
because they believe it is inherently unequal and subordinates
women. 9 Certain religious groups oppose polygamy because it
offends their particular view of morality. These groups have
made common cause on the issue of polygamy and desire its
abolition. They tend to support strict measures that criminalize
and punish polygamy.l 0 Yet, the demands made by antipolygamists on behalf of women mask the subordination of
religious groups that occurs through this "civilizing" discourse
and regulation."
On the other hand, in communities that religiously
sanction polygamy, conservatives who support the practice
7. It is important to note here that this Article does not suggest that India
and the United States are, in fact, comparable, except perhaps in the most
superficial ways and in their positive laws. Society and social facts on the ground
and the lived experiences of each population with its diversity and complexity
make generalized comparisons nearly impossible. For instance, it is difficult to
argue that women are similarly situated in the United States and India given
their different cultural, social, and religious milieus. The result is that law also
acts differently on them, shaping their lives differently. Polygamy regulation in
India, therefore, takes a different shape than it does in the United States.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the two systems cannot glean important
lessons from each other. This is the point of this Article.
8. See, e.g., Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance:
Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1589-93
(1997).
9. Regarding India, see ARCHANA PARASHAR, WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW
REFORM IN INDIA: UNIFORM CIVIL CODE AND GENDER EQUALITY 136 (1992) ("The

wives of polygamous unions were given no safeguards, and at the same time
polygamy was not made unattractive for men."). Regarding the United States, see
Strassberg, supra note 8, at 1591-92.
10. In India, the most anti-polygamy religious group has been the Hindu
nationalists, not because it offends their morality per se but because it represents
an unequal benefit enjoyed by Muslim men and also raises the specter of the everincreasing Muslim population. See FLAVIA AGNES, LAW AND GENDER INEQUALITY:
THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN INDIA 193 (1999).

I1. See, e.g., PARASHAR, supra note 9, at 139-43.
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have argued that it is a God-given "right" and that polygamy is
morally superior to the unbridled sexual freedoms allowed in
most "progressive" countries.12 These religious traditionalists
demand a position of state noninterference in their religious
practice. Traditionalist views elevate religious identity and
male supremacy over gender equality.13 Thus, the impasse
between traditionalists and anti-polygamists is reflected in the
legal debates surrounding the criminalization of polygamy.
I take a different position in this Article, neither calling for
the abolition of polygamy on moral or egalitarian grounds nor
taking the "free exercise" approach of traditionalists. Rather, I
call for an acknowledgement that criminalization of polygamy
has not resulted in its eradication and that it will never result
in complete abolition; indeed, the practice flourishes in some
communities even if driven into the closet by the law, and its
incidence in the United States might be increasing.14 Because
polygamy raises real issues for all involved that cannot be
adequately addressed through criminal law, we need to
manage the practice to incentivize fairness. In other words,
rather than focusing on stricter policing or more enforcement of
laws banning polygamy, redirecting the state's efforts to the
distribution of benefits and burdens within polygamous
families is a more fruitful way to change the practice and
ultimately make it more equitable (and perhaps less
desirable).1 5 In this endeavor, the example of the Indian
12. See M. Mustafa Ali Khan, Islamic Polygamy-A Blessing in Disguise, in
MODERN INDIAN FAMILY LAW 148, 156-57 (Werner F. Menski ed., 2001). Khan
notes:
Islam permits conditional polygamy. Christiandom forbids but winks at
it provided that no legal tie exists with more than one woman. There is
pretended monogamy in the West, but in fact there is polygamy without
responsibility. The mistress is cast off when the man becomes weary of
her and she sinks generally to be the woman of the street, for the lover
has no responsibility for her future and she is [a] hundred times worse
than the sheltered wife and mother in a polygamous Muslim family.
Id. at 158 (alteration in original).
13. Much of the argument rests on the view that polygamy does not "really"
disadvantage women and that Islam is not gender inequitable. See, e.g., Khan,
supra note 12, at 154-60. See generally MOHAMMAD SHABBIR, MUSLIM PERSONAL

LAW AND JUDICIARY (1988) (examining the codified Muslim Personal Law and its
conservative interpretation by the Indian courts).
14. See infra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
15. A similar approach is taken by Adrienne Davis in her work on polygamy.
See Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and
Bargainingfor Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2031-32 (2010) (taking an
approach that seeks to focus on the rules and regulations that govern polygamous
relationships to alter their distributive effects).
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judicial approach to polygamy in Hindu communities is
instructive. That approach reflects the kind of secularism
prevalent in India-accommodative yet also assimilationist, as
compared to the predominantly assimilative secularism in the
United States where the dominant discourse and regulatory
trend is firmly entrenched in abolitionism.
The Article proceeds in three parts: In Part I, I describe
the forms of secularism prevalent in the United States and
India, underscoring the different approaches taken to address
how secularism should interact with religion or tradition in the
state. The aim here is to ground the discussion in the legal
context within the respective countries in order to show how
religion is accommodated. In Part II, I examine the tension
between secularism and religion through a selection of
polygamy legislation and cases from both the United States
and India. These cases present an opportunity to examine the
way religious accommodation plays out in the different secular
states. This Part draws links between the abolitionist positions
taken in both contexts and raises questions about the efficacy
of criminalizing polygamy. It also calls attention to the tension
between feminist aims of gender equality and religious claims.
Finally, in Part III, I conclude that instead of focusing on
enforcement of the laws-the appetite for which has been
waning in the United States and has never been particularly
robust in India-we concentrate instead on reforming the laws
that distribute property and obligations within families with a
goal of protecting the parties and making them less vulnerable
to disinheritance and destitution. As such, laws dealing with
support and property distribution will have important
economic consequences for polygamous families.
I.

DIFFERENT FORMS OF SECULARISM IN TENSION WITH
RELIGION

A.

The United States' Secular Framework

The question of religious accommodation and the place of
tradition has been a perennial question in both U.S. and Indian
contexts. When confronted with the question of whether
religion should play a formal role in the legal system, the
founding fathers of the United States answered in the negative.
Having witnessed the detrimental effects of religious
intolerance in European society, they decided that, while both
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the free practice of religion and reasonable accommodation
should be afforded, there should be no established state
religion.16 Courts have interpreted the Establishment Clause
as an increasingly stringent bar against state favoritism
toward a particular religion.17 In other words, as is familiar to
most American lawyers, there has been a separation of church
and state preventing the state from entangling itself in
establishing a religion while allowing it to accommodate
various religious practices and communities.
In family law, where religious beliefs are frequently
implicated, courts have tried to respect religion without
entanglinf themselves in matters of religious doctrine and
They have attempted to accommodate religion
practice.
without becoming enmeshed in pronouncing upon matters of
religious doctrine. While the limits in the United States seem
fairly clear, the bright line becomes blurry when courts must
give force to religious contracts such as mahr agreements or
decide whether a religious marriage was validly entered into. 19
The United States' treatment of religion reflects one form
of secularism. In Gary Jacobsohn's view, the U.S. model is
assimilative in that it attempts to create a national civic and
political identity with which all citizens and aspiring citizens
must conform. 2 There is room and respect for diversity and
particular identities, but when individuals interact in public,
religion is, at least theoretically, unimportant.
Another way of describing the U.S. model of secularism is
conscriptional secularism. In other words, all those who choose
to become citizens of the United States are conscripted into a
form of public existence where their religious, racial, ethnic, or
other particular identities are subsumed under a national
identity: We are Americans first. 2 1 Yet America's tolerance for
16. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 1-2 (2007).
17. Id. at 18-19.
18. PASCALE FOURNIER, MUSLIM MARRIAGE IN WESTERN COURTS: LOST IN
TRANSPLANTATION 42-44 (2010).

19. Id. at 43-44. There are two types of mahr or "dower" paid to the bride
upon marriage. Prompt mahr is payable at the time of marriage, while deferred
mahr is payable at a later agreed-upon date or at the occurrence of an event such
as divorce. Id. at 1.
20. GARY JACOBSOHN, THE WHEEL OF THE LAW: INDIA'S SECULARISM IN
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 57-72 (2003).

2 1. Of course, there are more strictly conscriptional secularist models
available. For instance, in France, the importance of "Frenchness" and national
identity has led to laws that seek to erase differences from the public space in a

970

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

diversity through multiculturalism has given rise to a large
number of different ethnic and religious communities, most of
which flourish without hindrance as long as they obey the laws
of the land.22
Despite this separation of church and state that is
enshrined in the Constitution, the United States has struggled
with the role of religion in the public sphere. Its secularism
evolved from a time when Protestant Christianity's public
supremacy was unquestioned to the present when all religions,
including the socially dominant Protestantism, exist on
seemingly equal footing. 23 This evolution occurred, in part,
through legal challenges to school prayer, the appearance of
the Ten Commandments in public buildings, and
accommodation for religious
groups
in educational
institutions. 24
Challenges to certain social mores have also pushed back
the public role of religion. For instance, the right to privacy
evolved into its current form through challenges to bars against
contraception. 25 In these cases, the judiciary has had to
determine the proper role of religion in the law. The Supreme
rebuke of American multiculturalism. For an interesting perspective on the effects
of French laicitd, see JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, THE POLITICS OF THE VEIL 15-18

(2007). Lafcit means the separation of church and state through the state's
protection of individuals from the claims of religion. Id. at 15.
22. Increasingly, however, several laws have been proposed that seek to limit
accommodation and tolerance for cultural and ethnic differences. For instance, a
spate of anti-sharia laws have been proposed in several states that have the effect
of publicly stigmatizing Muslims. See Amy Sullivan, The Sharia Myth Sweeps
America, USA TODAY (June 12, 2011), http://www.usatoday.com/newslopinion/
forum/2011-06-12-Sharia-law-in-the-USAn.htm. Also, immigration laws continue
to be used to pursue Latinos, and Arizona has gone so far as to propose a law that
prohibits the teaching of ethnic history that causes divisiveness. See H.R. 2281,
49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), available at http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/
491eg/2r/bills/hb2281s.pdf.
23. Compare Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164-65 (1878), and Late
Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136
U.S. 1, 48-49 (1890), with Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), and State v.
Holm, 137 P.3d 726 (Utah 2006). The former cases clearly rely on majoritarian
values of Protestant Christianity.
24. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 599 ("No holding by this Court suggests that a school
can persuade or compel a student to participate in a religious exercise. That is
being done here, and it is forbidden by the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment."); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 39-43 (1980) (discussing the
unconstitutionality of displaying the Ten Commandments in public schools);
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203. 209-12 (1948) (holding
unconstitutional the use of public school facilities for religious instruction).
25. See generally Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (discussing the line of privacy cases, including Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
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Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which has been
evolving for the past fifty years, applies the test articulated in
Lemon v. Kurtzman and then modified in Agostini v. Felton.2 6
The test comprises three prongs: First, the state action in
question must serve a "secular purpose"; second, it must have a
secular effect; and third, it must not result in excessive
entanglement between church and state. 27 Subsequently, the
Agostini decision subsumed the entanglement inquiry into the
first prong, making it part of the secular purpose inquiry.
The structure of U.S. secularism as it has been understood
in the past fifty years-and the jurisprudence supporting ithas made it relatively easy to challenge laws that withhold
rights from some segments of the population. Increasingly, the
idea that moral repugnance is not enough to sustain certain
morals legislation, no matter how traditional, has become
common. Much of the activity in changing morals legislation
has been in the area of family law. Despite the fact that U.S.
family law is entirely civil and secular, tradition and religion
continue to play an important role in matters of family privacy,
particularly in the area of reproduction and sexual
relationships. 29 Moreover, religion continues to play a role in
marriage formation.3 0 Where there are private agreements
informed by religion, the courts are implicated in enforcing
these and may be required to engage religion in this context as
well. Nevertheless, society's common understanding of family
law in the United States is that it is a civil matter that does not
require the state to engage religion too deeply.3 1
26.

See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997); Lemon v. Kurtzman,

403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
27. MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A. DESTRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A
PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 288-93 (2d ed. 2002).

28. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996). Secularism at the founding of the nation was not understood to
be a total separation of church and state. Indeed, "disestablishment" was achieved
incrementally, and Jeffersonian secularism was hotly debated at the time. See
generally EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, SWORN ON THE ALTAR OF GOD: A RELIGIOUS
BIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (1996) (providing an account of the evolution

of Jefferson's religious thought and its place in the religious thought of his time).
29. Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence v. Texas indicates how much tradition
infused with religious values is at the heart of these matters. See Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 588-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
30. While no religious solemnization is required, some sort of ceremony is,
and this is often met by the undertaking of religious rites. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET
AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 69 (2d ed. 2009).

31. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 ("[W]e conclude that the cumulative impact of the
entire relationship arising under the statutes in each State involves excessive
entanglement between government and religion.").
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B. India's Secular Framework
Writing from his jail cell in India during the independence
struggle, Jawarharlal Nehru, one of the fathers of the modern
Indian state, noted: "The United States of America solves its
minority problems, more or less, by trying to make every
citizen 100 percent American. They make everyone conform to
a certain type. Other countries, with a longer and more
complicated past, are not so favorably situated.
Indeed, India's long history of religious pluralism made it
difficult to create a Uniform Civil Code for family law and to
remove religion from the public sphere at independence. 33 Nor
was that a shared goal of the founders. The importance of
religion to the identity of already existing populations at the
time of independence and their respective fear of being
subjected to forced assimilation and subordinated status
required Indian lawmakers to take a different approach than
that of their American counterparts two centuries before. 34 As
a result, Indian secularism is accommodative, allowing for all
religions to have equal footing in the public sphere as long as
the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Indian Constitution
are not breached. This idea is reflected in the ancient Indian
saying "sarva dharma sambhava" (all religions are equal).35
Rather than attempting to build a complete wall between
religion and state, India has enshrined religion into the state
while attempting to maintain an overall secular structure. 36
India's main concession to religious minority communities
was the retention of the codified version of their personal laws
or family laws. These laws were initially codified by the British
colonial administration in an effort to make their adjudication

32. JACOBSOHN, supra note 20, at 57 (quoting Jawarharlal Nehru). Nehru's
statement reflects his concern with the communal divisions in India, compared to
the United States, where race was the primary divider. Moreover, as Jacobsohn
points out: "[B]eing an American consists largely of sharing in those constitutive
ideas that define membership in the political community. Assimilation in this
context relates exclusively to principles, not to ethnically or religiously derived
models of ideal behavior working to achieve social conformity." Id. at 58.
33. See id.
34. See Cyra Akila Choudhury, (Mis)Appropriated Liberty: Identity, Gender
Justice, and Muslim Personal Law Reform in India, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
45, 52-59 (2008).
35. CHRISTOPHE JAFFRELOT, HINDU NATIONALISM: A READER 327 (2007).

36.

See JACOBSOHN, supra note 20, at 147.
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easier. 3 7 Post-independence, the laws remained in force, and,
for some communities, they were reformed and amended. 8 For
instance, the Hindu personal law was amended and liberalized
to provide greater protections for women. 39 On the other hand,
Muslim personal law has stagnated largely because that
community has viewed any efforts to formally amend the laws
as an attack on their religious identity and a move toward
forced assimilation. 4 0
The result of the personal law regime in India has meant
that the courts have had to interpret religious laws in a
majority of family matters.4 1 Far from the U.S. prohibition of
excessive entanglement, the Indian judiciary has on occasion
had to delve into religious doctrine in order to decide cases.42

37. See Nadya Haider, Comment, Islamic Legal Reform: The Case of Pakistan
and Family Law, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 287, 295 (2000); Purushottam
Bilimoria, Muslim Personal Law in India: Colonial Legacy and Current Debates,
EMORY L., http://www.law.emory.edulifl/cases/India.htm (last visited Mar. 9,
2012).
38. See Uniformity of Laws in India and England, in MODERN INDIAN FAMILY
LAW, supra note 12, at 360, 367.
39. See id. at 366-67.
40. See Bilimoria, supra note 37.
41. See generally K.B. AGRAWAL, FAMILY LAW IN INDIA (2010) (surveying
Hindu, Muslim, Christian, and Parsi personal law codes). The Special Marriage
Act of 1954 allows parties to opt in to a secular marriage. However, this law
leaves much to be desired and tends to favor the majority community. See LAW
COMM'N OF INDIA, FIFTY-NINTH REPORT ON HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955 AND
SPECIAL
MARRIAGE
ACT,
1954
(1974),
available
at
http://
lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/51-100/Report59.pdf.
42. See, e.g., Khan v. Begum, (1985) 3 S.C.R. 844 (India). This is the nowfamous Shah Bano case in which the Supreme Court of India was asked to decide
whether a Muslim wife could receive maintenance past the statutory three-month
period pursuant to the Code of Criminal Procedure, Act 11 (1974). Section 125 of
the Code requires husbands to maintain their wives. Id. at 852. While deciding
the case, the Court gratuitously commented:
[I]t is alleged that the fatal point in Islam is the degradation of woman.
To the Prophet is ascribed the statement, hopefully wrongly, that
[w]oman was made from a crooked rib, and if you try to bend it straight,
it will break; therefore treat your wives kindly. . . . It is too well-known
that [a] Mahomedan may have as many as four wives at the same time
but not more.
Id. at 849-50, 856 (internal quotation marks omitted). This statement was made
by a non-Muslim judge with no religious training while attempting to interpret a
Qur'anic passage. It was certainly not necessary to the central issue. Most Muslim
intelligentsia agreed that the Court decided correctly that the Code did not
conflict with Islamic law. Danial Latifi, The Shah Bano Hullabaloo in India,
Foreword to SHAH BANO AND THE MUSLIM WOMEN ACT A DECADE ON 7, 9 (Lucy
Carroll ed., 1998), available at http://www.wluml.org/sites/wluml.org/files/import/
english/pubs/pdf/misc/Shah-Bano-eng.pdf. However, the outcry generated by the
case among conservative Muslims resulted in the passage of the perversely named
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While the Indian courts have used a variety of interpretive
moves to reach just outcomes, they nevertheless cannot escape
from adjudicating a set of religious family laws. The conflict
between the Indian Constitution's protection of individual
liberties (much like the U.S. Bill of Rights) and those rights
accorded to groups through personal laws creates difficulties
for Indian courts attempting to resolve such cases. 43 This
tension has become intractable, particularly with regard to
women's rights in family law and property.44
In the late 1980s and through the 1990s, Indian women's
rights activists repeatedly called for the enactment of a
Uniform Civil Code to guarantee equal rights for women. 45
Personal laws, they argued, were a byzantine system that
afforded each confessional group a separate set of laws,
enshrined sexist religious norms, and conflicted with the
fundamental liberties guaranteed by the Indian Constitution.46
With the rise of right-wing Hindu groups, the civil code took on
a different valence. For Hindu nationalists, the call for a
uniform law was a means of removing the "privileges" given to
Muslim men. 47 Of particular vexation was Muslim men's legal
right to marry more than one woman. As such, the right-wing
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its affiliated Hindu
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, which closed that avenue
and limited the right of maintenance to the statutory three-month period stated
in Muslim personal law. Id. at 9-11. For excellent examinations of the impact of
the Shah Bano case, see Lucy Carroll, Divorced Muslim Women in India: Shah
Bano, the Muslim Women Act, and the Significance of the Bangladesh Decision, in
SHAH BANO AND THE MUSLIM WOMEN ACT A DECADE ON, supra, at 35; Danial

Latifi, Muslim Women Benefited: Shah Bano Revisited, in SHAH BANO AND THE
MUSLIM WOMEN ACT A DECADE ON, supra, at 143.

43. Choudhury, supra note 34, at 65. The Fundamental Rights enshrined in
the Indian Constitution are extensive and reflect both a formal and substantive
understanding of equality. Part III enumerates articles that cover the right to
equality (Article 14), prohibitions against discrimination (Articles 15 and 16),
freedom of expression (Article 19), and freedom of religion (Article 25). See INDIA
CONST. arts. 14-35.
44. Inheritance laws have for the most part maintained male privilege in all
of the communities where it has existed. The Hindu inheritance laws were
recently amended to put men and women on equal footing, but prior to this, males
were preferred, and Muslim inheritance laws clearly favor male heirs. For an
interesting analysis of changes in inheritance, see Modernity and the Family in
Indian Law, in MODERN INDIAN FAMILY LAW, supra note 12, at 295, 296-98.
45. See RAJESWARI SUNDER RAJAN, THE SCANDAL OF THE STATE: WOMEN,
LAW AND CITIZENSHIP IN POSTCOLONIAL INDIA 149-50 (2003).

46. See Brenda Cossman & Ratna Kapur, Secularism's Last Sigh?: The Hindu
Right, the Courts, and India's Struggle for Democracy, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 113,
169 (1997).
47. Id. at 133-34.
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nationalist groups saw the abolition of personal laws as a step
to assimilating religious minorities and thus pursued it with
aggression. 48 Women's groups wanted the Uniform Civil Code
to improve women's rights, and the Right wing wanted it to
reduce minority men's privileges; together, they made strange
bedfellows. Progressive women's groups that had traditionally
championed the civil code retreated from their position when it
became clear that the issue had largely been co-opted by the
Hindu nationalists and made into a weapon against minority
communities. 4 9 Nevertheless, the hope for a gender-just code
that replaces personal law still burns, albeit dimly.
Because the realization of a Uniform Civil Code as stated
in Article 44 of the Indian Constitution has become a near
impossibility,5 0 Indian courts are left in the thickets of religious
law. In order to preserve reforms to personal law and uphold
laws that conflict with religion, the Indian Supreme Court has
taken a two-pronged approach. First, under Article 25(2)(b) of
the Constitution, social reform takes precedence over religion,
and the Supreme Court has deferred to the legislative branch
when it enacts reforms for the good of the people.51 In other
words, the Supreme Court can uphold a particular social
reform, even when it infringes religious practice, if it is for the
common good. The second approach that was adapted from
U.S. free exercise jurisprudence is the "essentials of religion"
test, in which the Supreme Court may deny constitutional
protection to those practices that are not essential to the
52
religion.
These two techniques that allow the Court to uphold social
reform regardless of its impact on religion are reflective of the
48.

Id. at 115-16.

49. See Choudhury, supra note 34, at 79.
50. I have written about this extensively, arguing that, given the political
context of modern India and the symbolic importance of personal law as a marker
of both difference and independent identity for Muslims, any move toward a
uniform law will be vigorously resisted. However, this does not mean that the
personal laws cannot be internally reformed. See id.
51. See INDIA CONST. art. 25, § 2. The Constitution states:
Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or
prevent the State from making any law(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or
other secular activity which may be associated with religious
practice;
(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of
Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes
and sections of Hindus.
52. See JACOBSOHN, supra note 20, at 97.
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structure of Indian secularism, which Jacobsohn calls
"ameliorative." 53 It is ameliorative because it allows the state
to use secularism and secular law as a tool to undo centuries of
injustices and inequalities justified through religion.5 4 The
Indian judiciary, thus, sees its activism on behalf of social
reform as entirely within the bounds of the constitutional
framework envisioned by the architects of the Indian state.
Despite the use of secularism to undo religiously sanctioned
injustice, the state and the courts continue to accommodate
difference, or pluralism, which is both a legal and cultural
value in India.
It is important to stress that Jacobsohn's categories are not
airtight compartments. Rather, because of the heterogeneous
and federal nature of both countries, there are multiple copresent tendencies at play. India certainly has an
assimilationist bent when it comes to all Hindus regardless of
their caste, language,
or location, but
India is
accommodationist when it comes to Muslims. On the other
hand, multiculturalism and the commitment to religious liberty
have resulted in the accommodation of religious minorities in
the United States.
Jacobsohn's categories, however, are helpful as a
framework for understanding the structural differences
between India and the United States. India's secularism allows
significant "entanglement" between church and state, with the
state administering religious law, while a similar role would be
beyond the pale of U.S. judicial authority. Parts II and III
below elaborate on the divergences and convergences in the
legal accommodation of religion through a discussion on the
regulation of polygamy.
II. ABOLITION V. ACCOMMODATION: THE CONTINUING
CHALLENGE OF PLURAL MARRIAGES

Although secularism in India and the United States takes
very different forms, both countries struggle with similar
controversies in family law. These debates and conflicts mirror
battles in the social sphere. The tension between traditional
religious values and secularism can also be viewed as one
between communal or group rights and individual rights. In

53.
54.

Id. at 91.
Id.
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both countries, constitutionally protected individual liberties
run up against the long-held traditions of the majority or the
group, whether that is a family or religious community.5 5 The
debate surrounding polygamy exemplifies this tension, and the
practice has most often been defended or demanded as part of
the right to the free practice of religion in both countries.
Religion is deployed as a shield to protect the practice of
polygamy, pitting faith against claims of modernity, gender
justice, and equality. The polygamy laws in the United States
and India provide insight into how each legal system reconciles
(or fails to reconcile) religion with personal and communal
rights. Moreover, the arguments surrounding polygamy also
implicate discourses about race and progress that have long
been tributaries of this central debate.
In this Part, I describe the historical regulation of
polygamy in both India and the United States. The purpose of
this discussion is to illustrate the way in which the
assimilationist secular framework in the United States led to a
vigorous enforcement of a ban on bigamy. Indeed, the fear of
Mormon political power in addition to Mormons' adherence to
the practice of polygamy gave rise to the suppression of
difference. In the United States, the dominant legal discourse
still treats polygamy as a moral offense and takes an
55. For a discussion of India's conflict, see TAHIR MAHMOOD, PERSONAL LAWS
IN CRISIS 6 (1986) (discussing the progression from the pre-constitutional era of
personal law to the eventual uniform law and finding that, in the interim, "all
laws enacted in the area of personal laws must conform to the provisions of Part
III of the Constitution dealing with Fundamental Rights"). For a prime example of
this conflict in a state court in the United States, see State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820
(Utah 2004). The Green court noted:
First, Green is not the first polygamist to launch an attack on the
constitutionality of a law burdening the practice of polygamy. In 1878,
polygamist George Reynolds challenged the constitutionality of the
Morrill Antibigamy Act, which prohibited bigamy in all territories of the
United States. Reynolds argued that he could not be found guilty under
the law inasmuch as he believed that marrying more than one woman
was his religious duty. The Supreme Court held that the law did not
violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, finding, in
part, that "[1]aws are made for the government of actions, and while they
cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with
practices." Otherwise, reasoned the Court, "professed doctrines of
religious belief [would be] superior to the law of the land, and in effect
... permit every citizen to become a law unto himself." The Supreme
Court reviewed the practice of polygamy, found it to be socially
undesirable, and upheld Reynolds' bigamy conviction.
Id. at 825 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878)).
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abolitionist/criminalization position, enforcing a singular moral
vision uniformly.5 6
In India, in contrast, the courts carefully navigate between
honoring secular tendencies to reform religious personal law
and accommodating minority religions. There is both an
assimilationist and an accommodationist tendency. When the
Indian courts have confronted constitutional challenges to
positive laws that either permit or ban polygamy, they have
been deferential to the legislature. 57 However, this deference
extends only as far as upholding the statutes governing
polygamy. In adjudicating the practice of polygamy, Indian
courts are much more sensitive to differences in religious
communities, the welfare of women and children, and the
impact of criminal sanctions. 5 8

A.

The United States: Zero Tolerance for Polygamy

It has become axiomatic that there is no "federal" family
law in the United States despite the raft of legislation that
touches upon the family. The growth in federal regulation in
the last three decades in areas such as interstate child support
and custody has fueled the perception that the federal
government has embarked on the regulation of families.
Depending on your perspective, this increased federalization is

56. For instance, those opposing same-sex marriage often couple it with
polygamy as equally morally offensive. The argument typically goes that if we
allow same-sex marriage, we are on the path to allowing polygamy. See generally
David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53
(1997); Jaime M. Gher, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage-Allies or Adversaries
Within the Same-Sex Marriage Movement, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 559
(2008); Eugene Volokh, Same Sex Marriageand Slippery Slopes, 33 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1155 (2005). Similarly, Justice Scalia makes this "what next" point in his
dissent in Lawrence, arguing that we are on a slippery slope toward no regulation
of entry into marriage. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588-92 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). In the subsequent parts of this Article, when I refer to the abolitionist
position, I mean a position that considers polygamy to be a moral evil that ought
to be eradicated through the criminal law. Although this term is primarily used in
conjunction with slavery, it is interesting to note the twin histories of polygamy
and slavery, with the same groups of people historically advocating for the
abolition of both, polygamy being described as a "form of slavery." See infra notes
183-84 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 140-57 and accompanying text discussing Narasu Appa
Mali. In that case, the court noted the legislature's authority to regulate for the
social good.
58. See infra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
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either a cause for concern or celebration. 5 9 However, even a
cursory familiarity with the history of polygamy in the Mormon
community shows that there was a time in the 1800s when the
federal government was heavily involved in regulating family
form. Of course, there were other motives for the anti-polygamy
regulations that I will discuss briefly below; 60 nevertheless, the
foray into family law by the federal government is often
overlooked in family law texts and by scholars.
From the mid-1800s to the turn of the century, the federal
government passed a raft of legislation aimed at curbing the
Mormon Church's financial and political power and its practice
of polygamy. The first salvo in the war on polygamy was the
Morrill Anti-bigamy Act of 1862.61 The Morrill Act criminalized
bigamy and reintroduced mortmain laws restricting the
amount of property that the Mormon Church could own in any
territory of the Union to a value of $50,000.62 The Morrill Act
went largely unenforced "due to difficulties establishing proof
of a second marriage without public or church records,
uncooperative Mormon witnesses, and Mormon control of the
was
This
ineffectual
regulation
Utah
judiciary." 63
supplemented by the Poland Act of 1874.64
The Poland Act limited the control of the judiciary by the
Mormon Church.6 5 Utah state courts were deprived of
jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases, which were instead
tried in federal district courts. 66 After the passage of the
Poland Act, the Morrill Act was challenged in the Reynolds
case discussed below. 67

59. See Meredith Johnson Harbach, Is the Family a Federal Question?, 66
WASH, & LEE L. REV. 131, 133-35 (2009).
60. See infra notes 80-94, 98-101 and accompanying text.
61. Morrill Anti-bigamy Act of 1862, ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501 (repealed 1910).
62. SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 81-82 (2002).
"Mortmain" is defined as
[t]he condition of lands or tenements held in perpetuity by an
ecclesiastical or other corporation. Land alienated in mortmain is not
inalienable, but it will never escheat or pass by inheritance (and thus no
inheritance taxes will ever be paid) because a corporation does not die.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1105 (9th ed. 2009).
63. Martha M. Ertman, Race Treason: The Untold Story of America's Ban on
Polygamy, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 287, 294 n.26 (2010).
64. Poland Act of 1874, ch. 469, 18 Stat. 253.
65. See GORDON, supra note 62, at 111-13.
66. See Poland Act § 3.
67. See infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
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Despite being upheld as constitutional, the Morrill and
Poland Acts failed to curb the practice of polygamy. The next
piece of legislation that sought to redress that defect was the
Edmunds Act of 1882.68 This law criminalized cohabitation,
punishing it with a fine of $300 (a very steep fine equivalent to
approximately $6,600 in current terms 6 9) or six months in
prison. The law also disqualified polygamists and believers in
polygamy from serving on juries 70 and barred polygamists from
voting or holding public office. 7 1
Unfortunately for the federal authorities, the Edmunds Act
was just as ineffective at stamping out polygamy as the Morrill
and Poland Acts. The final attack on polygamy came with the
Edmunds-Tucker Act of 1887.72 This was the most severe of the
laws passed to date, and Martha Ertman summarizes:
This law eliminated evidentiary obstacles in polygamy
prosecutions, allowed the state to compel wives to testify
against their polygamous husbands, allowed adultery
prosecutions to be instituted by the state rather than the
spouse, required registration of every "ceremony of
marriage, or in the nature of a marriage ceremony,"
68. See GORDON, supra note 62, at 152-55. For an interesting article
reporting on the Supreme Court decision upholding the Edmunds Act, see The
Anti-polygamy Law-Its Constitutionality Upheld by the Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES (1VIar. 24, 1885), http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=
9DO5E6DC1030E433A25757C2A9659C94649FD7CF.
69. See MEASURING WORTH, http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare (last
visited Dec. 7, 2011) (enter 1882 for "Initial Year," $300 for "Initial Amount," and
2010 for "Desired Year").
70. Edmunds Act of 1882, ch. 47, § 5, 22 Stat. 30, 31.
71. Id.; see also GORDON, supra note 62, at 152-55. In Davis v. Beason, the
U.S. Supreme Court upheld a law passed by Idaho prohibiting polygamists and
proponents of polygamy from holding public office. Samuel D. Davis was indicted
under the law for attempting to procure himself along with other disqualified
parties as electors of the County of Oneida. 133 U.S. 333, 334, 347-48 (1890). The
Court, following its prior jurisprudence, made a distinction between free belief
and religiously sanctioned practice that conflicts with government criminal laws:
It is assumed by counsel of the petitioner that, because no mode of
worship can be established, or religious tenets enforced, in this country,
therefore any form of worship may be followed, and any tenets, however
destructive of society, may be held and advocated, if asserted to be a part
of the religious doctrines of those advocating and practicing them. But
nothing is further from the truth. While legislation for the establishment
of a religion is forbidden, and its free exercise permitted, it does not
follow that everything which may be so called can be tolerated. Crime is
not the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect may
designate as "religion."
Id. at 345.
72. See GORDON, supra note 62, at 196-98.
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federalized the probate courts, disinherited the children of
polygamists, re-established dower to assert the power of the
first wife in a plural marriage, disenfranchised Utah woman
[sic], and placed schools, districting, and the territorial
militia known as the Nauvoo Legion under federal control.
But most importantly, the Edmund-Tuckers [sic] Act
reaffirmed the Morrill Act's revocation of the Mormon
Church's corporate status and directed the Attorney
General to wind up the corporation's affairs and seize
Church property. 7 3
While these acts were being legislated, Mormons mounted
challenges to their constitutionality. The often-cited, seminal
case dealing with polygamy in the United States is Reynolds v.
United States.74 The test case was brought after the enactment
of the Poland Act and challenged the constitutionality of the
Morrill Act. 75
Reynolds is a familiar case to First Amendment and
family-law scholars because the Court was confronted for the
first time with the task of reconciling the claim to freedom of
religion and the state's disapprobation of polygamy. Mr.
Reynolds, a practicing Mormon, was convicted of bigamy for
entering into a plural marriage and challenged the criminal
law on First Amendment grounds. 76 One of the questions
presented in the case was whether the accused should have
been "acquitted if he married the second time, because he
believed it to be his religious duty."7 7 The Court categorically
answered negatively.7 8
The Court found that the state may criminalize behavior
and action that was subversive of "good order." 79 Monogamy
was ideologically linked to the societal structure that the state
was meant to preserve.8 0 And it was polygamy that threatened

73. Ertman, supra note 63, at 294-95 n.26 (citation omitted) (quoting
Edmunds-Tucker Act of 1887, ch. 397, 24 Stat. 635, 636 (repealed 1978)).
74. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
75. See GORDON, supra note 62, at 97.
76. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164-67.
77. Id. at 153.
78. Id. at 162.
79. Id. at 167 ("To permit [a defense of religious belief against criminal
conviction] would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to
the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto
himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances.").
80. Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishingthe Family, 119 YALE
L.J. 1236, 1261-63 (2010).
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the secular, political institution of democracy, as Alice Ristroph
and Melissa Murray note:
Moreover, if monogamous marriage was the foundation
"[u]pon [which] society may be said to be built," children
raised in polygamy would be dangerously ignorant of the
"social relations and social obligations and duties"
associated with monogamy. Their understanding of the
"family," that critical unit of society and democracy, would
be shaped by the norms and values more familiar to "Asiatic
and .

.

. African people." And perhaps most troubling of all,

through the power of reproduction, polygamy would expand
with each successive generation of Mormons to the point
that polygamous families could eventually disrupt the
predominance of the monogamous marital family.8 1
The Court in Reynolds made a distinction between sincere
belief and action. While the former could be respected as a
matter of conscience, action or practice could be circumscribed
when there were higher values like democracy and societal
order at stake. 82 The Court also added that "polygamy leads to
the patriarchal principle, and which, when applied to large
communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism, while
that princip le cannot long exist in connection with
monogamy."83 The Court insinuated that this form of family
was unjust to women, a thread that was later taken up by
abolitionists using the concern for women and children to
justify criminalization.8 4
The Court linked the form of marriage to the viability of
the state itself. If the state were to refrain from applying
criminal sanctions against polygamists because of the defense
of religious obligation, "every citizen [would] become a law unto
himself."85 The Court underscored the limits of tolerance by
giving the example of human sacrifice, a practice that the
Court would not tolerate regardless of whether it was an
obligation of a religious group. 86 However, the Court's concern
about polygamy's impact on the state hides the Court's real

81. Id. at 1262-63 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164-65).
82. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167.
83. Id. at 166.
84. Compare id., with State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820 (Utah 2004).
85. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167.
86. Id. at 166.
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concern about the Mormon Church and its political and
economic power in general.
Tracing the history of the Mormon Church's interaction
with the state, David Chambers has shown that Mormons
encountered resistance from the Protestant majority well
before they began to engage in polygamy. 87 The Protestants
saw the Mormons' existence as a political threat, resulting in
increasing amounts of regulation and violence.8 8 Despite very
little evidence supporting the Protestants' stereotypical claims
of immorality, violence, and subordination of women and
children, Congress continued to pass laws to regulate
Mormons. Moreover, in decisions like Mormon Church v.
United States, the Court routinely upheld the constitutionality
of laws which went so far as to allow seizure of church assets
and disestablishment. 89
In the Mormon Church decision, the Court made a number
of incredible assertions:
The organization of a community for the spread and practice
of polygamy is, in a measure, a return to barbarism. It is
contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization
which Christianity has produced in the western world. The
question, therefore, is whether the promotion of such a
nefarious system and practice, so repugnant to our laws and
to the principles of our civilization, is to be allowed to
continue by the sanction of the government itself, and
whether the funds accumulated for that purpose shall be
restored to the same unlawful uses as heretofore, to the
detriment of the true interests of civil society. 90
Use of terms such as "barbarism" and the overt reference to
Christianity as the litmus test of civilization is rare in Supreme
Court decisions today.
Further, in Cleveland v. United States, the Court held that
polygamous practices fall within the purview of the Mann Act's
prohibition of the transportation of women and girls across

87. See Chambers, supra note 56, at 61-74 (detailing the history of
governmental regulation of polygamy).
88. Id.; see also Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that the Mormon Church's property
could be seized and that the Church could be disincorporated because of its
adherence to the practice of polygamy made illegal by federal law).
89. See Latter-Day Saints, 136 U.S. at 49; see also Chambers, supra note 56,
at 65.
90. Latter-Day Saints, 136 U.S. at 49.
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state borders "for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or
for any other immoral purpose." 9 1 Similar to prior cases,
Justice Douglas opined that a defense of sincere religious belief
against the Mann Act "would place beyond the law any act
done under claim of religious sanction." 9 2 He also somewhat
gratuitously remarked that polygamous households are a
"notorious example of promiscuity." 93 The overt privileging of
the dominant religion would obviously not stand now, but, at
the time, the Court had no qualms about voicing its prejudice
and incorporating the vernacular of civilization. 94
In the cases that came after the turn of the twentieth
century, the sharp distinction between belief and practice
somewhat eroded. The Court conceded that state infringement
91. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 16 (1946) (quoting White-Slave
Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825, 826 (1910)).
92. Id. at 20. The Court held:
[Ilt has long been held that the fact that polygamy is supported by a
religious creed affords no defense in a prosecution for bigamy. Whether
an act is immoral within the meaning of the statute is not to be
determined by the accused's concepts of morality. Congress has provided
the standard. The offense is complete if the accused intended to perform,
and did in fact perform, the act which the statute condemns, viz., the
transportation of a woman for the purpose of making her his plural wife
or cohabiting with her as such.
Id. (citation omitted).
93. Id. at 19.
94. It is interesting to note the evolution of "morality" and the deference to
Congressional definitions of such concepts in the Court's jurisprudence. While
religious belief still provides no shelter from prosecution, morality is no longer an
adequate rationale for legislation without some other basis. For instance, in
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the Court held that disapprobation of a
particular minority alone would not provide the legislature with a rational basis
for carving it out of antidiscrimination laws:
[L]aws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the
disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons
affected. "[I]f the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the
laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare ...
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest."
Id. at 634 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Dep't of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). Further, in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003), overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Court opined:
[Tlhe Court in Bowers was making the broader point that for centuries
there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as
immoral.

. .

. [But the] issue before us is whether the majority may use

the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society
through operation of the criminal law. "Our obligation is to define the
liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code."
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
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on certain practices, regardless of whether it was justified as a
necessity to ensure good order or democracy, was a violation of
the First Amendment. 9 5 For instance, in Wisconsin v. Yoder
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court held that infringing
upon parents' rights to not send their children to public school
or to choose religious education instead of public education
violated the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment. 9 6 if
one concedes that public education is as important as family
form in creating a citizenry with shared values, these cases
clearly pulled back from Reynolds and revealed the weakness
of the Reynolds argument. Cleveland, decided temporally
between Pierce and Yoder, saw a return of Reynolds' reasoning
that belief and practice must be differentiated. This culminated
in Employment Division v. Smith, in which the Court further
clarified that any neutral law of general applicability will not
fail even if it burdens religious exercise as long as the law is
not targeted specifically toward that religious exercise.97
Anti-polygamy laws did not ostensibly target Mormons as
a group for their religious beliefs, or so the argument went.
Rather, historically Congress aimed the laws at the
preservation of Protestant Christian morality, the protection of
women and children, and the promotion of a shared set of civic
values. 9 8 In more recent times, the Court has upheld laws
prohibiting bigamy because it offends "public policy." 9 9 In

95. For instance, in several cases, the Court held that the state could not
infringe on parental rights to educate their children according to religious belief.
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925). The fact that public education is a very important means by
which a citizenry is trained to share values seems to undercut the rationale put
forth in Reynolds.
96. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
97. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) ("The government's ability
to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its
ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, 'cannot depend on measuring the
effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development.' ")
(quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)).
98. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 19 (1946); Davis v. Beason,
133 U.S. 333, 345 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 168 (1878).
99. Any scholarship on the history of federal regulation of polygamy is
inevitably indebted to the work of Sarah Barringer Gordon. In her book THE
MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH

CENTURY AMERICA, she traces the evolution of federal regulation to show how the
federal government was indeed very concerned about the growing power of
Mormons. The fact that they as a separate community would have control over an
entire state was cause for deep anxiety. Polygamy laws were a way to reign in
Mormons for a practice that was largely viewed negatively. The court cases that
were brought enforcing polygamy say nothing about Mormonism or its political
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reality, the history of the legal enactments against the Mormon
Church reveals that these laws were primarily targeted at a
church that unsettled the dominant religious establishments
with its political, economic, and territorial power. 00 The
ongoing pressure to discipline the Mormon Church did have
some effect. The Church elders officially repudiated "celestial
marriage" or polygamy in 1890.101 The declaration of the end of

polygamy as a religious principle or obligation saw only a
formal end in doctrine. Yet, this was not the end of the practice
or the story.
As the practice continued, so did the pursuit of
polygamists. The definitive assault on the Mormon Church
came in 1953 when the Governor of Arizona authorized a
massive raid on Short Creek, a town on the border between
Arizona and Utah, in order to rescue the women and children
of a polygamous community. 102 In the prosecution of the Black
family, captured in that raid, the government asserted that the
children were inadequately fed and clothed; however, the
government was unable to prove these charges. 0 3 Ultimately,
the children were removed because the court found the children
to have been neglected based on the family's polygamous
lifestyle.104 The Utah Supreme Court upheld the removal, with
Justice Worthen asserting that the juvenile court had been "too
power generally. Rather, the cases again and again refer to morality and the civic
impact of such practices. See GORDON, supra note 62, at 3-15, 81-83, 135.
Although morality has gone out of fashion in terms of being the basis for what is
essentially "morals legislation," the reason that anti-polygamy bans are upheld
and that foreign polygamous unions are not given comity is usually public policy.
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 281-284 (West 1872); FLA. STAT. § 826.01 (1868);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.15 (McKinney 1965); State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 754-55
(Utah 2006) (Nehring, J., concurring); State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 829-30 (Utah
2004).
100. The various federal enactments contain not just criminal sanctions for the
practice of polygamy but also measures weakening the Mormon Church and its
adherents. For a discussion of federal acts and prohibitions on voting, serving on
juries, holding public office, and attempts at curbing property holdings and
disestablishment of the Mormon Church, see supra notes 61-67 and
accompanying text.
101. PATRICK Q. MASON, THE MORMON MENACE: VIOLENCE AND ANTIMORMONISM IN THE POSTBELLUM SOUTH 18 (2011).

102. Short Creek, Arizona sits on the border of Utah and Arizona and has
continued to be a polygamous stronghold. It is now two towns, Colorado City on
the Arizona side and Hildale on the Utah side. In the aftermath of the raid, both
Arizona and Utah prosecuted the polygamists. See generally MARTHA SONNTAG
BRADLEY, KIDNAPPED FROM THAT LAND: THE GOVERNMENT RAIDS ON THE SHORT
CREEK POLYGAMISTS (1993).
103. Id. at 168-74.
104. In re Black, 283 P.2d 887, 910-11 (Utah 1955).
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lenient" because it had left open the possibility of returning the
children to the parents if they reformed, that is to say,
eschewed polygamy.105 As one commentator observed, Justice
Worthen "would have preferred to sever parental rights so that
the children could be brought up 'as law-abiding citizens in
righteous homes.' "106
After the disastrous failure of the Short Creek encounter,
which produced a societal backlash and raised sympathy for
Polygamy
prosecutions
subsided. 107
the
polygamists,
prosecutions rose once again in the late 1990s and the 2000s,
primarily as a result of the involvement of young girls in child
marriages.los More recent prosecutions of what are now fringe
elements of the Mormon Church are in line with the dominant
abolitionist position. 109
In State v. Holm, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the
conviction of a polygamist for violating the state law
prohibiting people from "purporting to marry" or cohabiting
with a woman while being married to another.1 10 The case
involved a man who had married one woman legally and two
others in religious ceremonies. One of the "informal" wives was
the sister of his legal wife and was a minor at the time. I
Certainly, laws sanctioning sex with a minor would have

105. Id. at 913.
106. Chambers, supra note 56, at 69 (quoting Black, 283 P.2d at 913).
107. See Neil J. Young, Short Creek's Long Legacy, SLATE (Apr. 16, 2008, 1:15
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/faithbased/2008/04/short-creekslong
legacy.2.html.
108. Id. Polygamist sects of the Mormon Church have been in the news more
recently with the prosecution of Warren Jeffs, the leader of the Fundamentalist
Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints. See, e.g., Lee Benson, Texas Raid
Has Opened Can of Worms, DESERET NEWS (Apr. 20, 2008, 12:24 AM),
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/695272068/Texas-raid-has-opened-can-ofworms.html; Texas: Polygamist Leader Convicted, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 4, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/05/us/05brfs-Texas.html.
109. See, e.g., State v. Jeffs, 243 P.3d 1250 (Utah 2010); State v. Holm, 137
P.3d 726 (Utah 2006); State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820 (Utah 2004).
110. Holm, 137 P.3d at 732 ("Holm was convicted pursuant to Utah's bigamy
statute, which provides that '[a] person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing he has
a husband or wife or knowing the other person has a husband or wife, the person
purports to marry another person or cohabits with another person.' ") (alteration
in original) (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7- 101 (West 2003)).
111. Id. at 730. Holm married Suzie Stubbs in a legal ceremony and Wendy
Holm in a religious ceremony. He then married Ruthie Stubbs, sister to Suzie,
when she was sixteen. He was prosecuted under the bigamy statute and also
charged with unlawful sexual conduct with a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old. Id.
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adequately punished Mr. Holm in this case; however, he was
also convicted of violating the polygamy ban. 112
Mr. Holm's subsequent challenge on constitutional grounds
followed the well-traveled arguments based on the right to
privacy. The Utah Supreme Court was unsympathetic to claims
that informal marriages should not be regulated because they
seek no state recognition.1 1 3 The case is particularly important
because it punished informal polygamous relationships when
there was only one legal marriage. No privacy right was found
to protect the consensual, adult relationships in the de facto
polygamous household. 14
112. Id.
113. Id. at 732-33. The court was very unsympathetic to a strictly formalist
reading of the statute. Holm's contention that no party was under any illusion
that the marriages subsequent to the first legal marriage would receive any state
recognition did not help him escape the reach of the statute. Rather, the court
looked at the reality behind the ceremonies and applied a substantive approach to
its analysis of marriage:
Specifically, Holm argues that he did not "purport to marry" Ruth
Stubbs, as that phrase is used in the bigamy statute, because the word
"marry" in subsection 76-7-101(1) refers only to legal marriage and
neither Holm nor Stubbs contemplated that the religious ceremony
solemnizing their relationship would entitle them to any of the legal
benefits attendant to state-sanctioned matrimony. Second, Holm argues
that his conviction under the bigamy statute was unconstitutional as
applied in this case because it unduly infringes upon his right to practice
his religion, as guaranteed by our state constitution. Third, Holm argues
that his conviction under the bigamy statute was unconstitutional under
the federal constitution. Fourth, Holm argues that the trial court
improperly excluded expert testimony that was offered to rebut the
State's characterization of polygamous culture.
We reject each of these arguments. The "purports to marry" language
contained in the bigamy statute is not confined to legal marriage and is,
in fact, broad enough to cover the type of religious solemnization
engaged in by Holm and Stubbs. We further conclude that the ability to
engage in polygamous behavior is expressly excepted from the religious
protections afforded by our state constitution. We are also unpersuaded
that the federal constitution mandates that the states of this union
tolerate polygamous behavior in the name of substantive due process or
freedom of association. Additionally, in the face of controlling United
States Supreme Court authority, we are constrained to conclude that the
federal constitution does not protect Holm from bigamy prosecution on
religious freedom grounds. Finally, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by excluding Holm's proffered expert testimony
because the testimony was not directly related to the questions before
the jury and may have confused or distracted the jury.
Id.
114. Id. at 743. The Court distinguished Holm's case from Lawrence v. Texas in
two ways. First, marriage has a public character and as such cannot be considered
to be a wholly private consensual act. Second, Holm's case involved a minor,
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While the case raises questions about the extent of state
power in regulating private, consensual, adult sexual activityboth spatial and decisional privacy rights thought to be safe
after Lawrence v. Texas-it is fully in line with the troubling
history of polygamy abolitionism and the majoritarian disgust
for the institution. As I noted above, polygamy was not the sole
concern driving the persecution of Mormons; there were also
political reasons for the aggressive approach taken by the state
that concerned the regional power of the Mormon Church.
Nathan Oman has argued that Reynolds should be read as
part of an imperial project of building the American empire in
the Reconstruction period.! 15 By tying the practice of polygamy
to Asiatic and African races, the Reynolds court was positioning
itself as part of a civilizing force and equating the Mormons
with the less evolved "barbarians." 16 The Court then went on
to reinforce this characterization, asking "if a wife religiously
believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile
[sic] of her dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the
civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into
practice?" 1 7 Oman argues that this was not simply a glib
comparison to Hinduism's practice of sati or widow immolation
but that
[i]t was a jurisprudential reference with a long history in
the anti-polygamy battles. At the heart of this reference was
a two-step move. First, the Mormons were conceptualized as
a foreign race akin to the inhabitants of the Indian
subcontinent, and second, the federal rule in territorial
Utah was likened to the British Raj in India, bringing
civilization through law to the benighted masses over whom
it ruled.118
Having equated Mormons with an alien people complete with
barbaric practices, odd biological functions, and lascivious

which immediately placed it in a different category from the conduct at issue in
Lawrence. Id. at 743-44.
115. See Nathan B. Oman, Natural Law and the Rhetoric of Empire: Reynolds
v. United States, Polygamy, and Imperialism, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 661, 666-67
(2011).
116. See id. at 698-702.
117. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878); see also Oman, supra
note 115, at 664-67.
118. Oman, supra note 115, at 681.
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natures, the state put itself in the position of the civilizer and
law-bringer.119
Indeed, as Martha Ertman argues, the Mormon difference
was worse because it was also race-traitorous. 12 0 While the
Asiatic, African, and Islamic practices of polygamy were
considered barbaric, they were also considered natural to those
races and beliefs.121 Mormons as white men were acting
against their nature and their race. The practice of polygamy
placed them on the same footing as Hindus and Muslims,
where sati and polygamy were normal. Women from those
communities were thought to be trained for it, while Mormon
women were subjugated into the other "peculiar institution."1 22
The anti-polygamists argued that they were in the same
position of the Raj in banning sati.123 Oddly, while some in the
decriminalization camp argued that the comparison was
inapposite because the British Raj did not ban polygamy (sati
is quite a different practice in its impact on the practitioners)
and that it did not consider it a contravention of divine law,
that argument had no traction. 124
While the state was key in pursuing and prosecuting
Mormon polygamists, much of the social impetus to support
such regulation came from abolitionist women who knew next
to nothing about the real lives of polygamous women, and
whose information was taken from "refugees" of Mormon
polygamy.125 The rise of the anti-polygamist novel fueled the

119. See Ertman, supra note 63, at 308 ("Again and again, commentators from
high culture (media and legal experts mainly) and popular culture (cartoonists
and authors of magazine articles) portray Mormons as barbaric, lascivious,
despotic, disorderly, foreign, Black, Asian, and/or childish.").
120. Id. at 288-90.
121. Id. at 313.
122. See GORDON, supra note 62, at 55 (discussing the close links between
polygamy and slavery abolitionism).
123. See Oman, supra note 115, at 695-96.
124. See id. The Indian Penal Code of 1860 criminalizes polygamy for
communities in which it is religiously prohibited. Thus, for Hindus and Muslims
whose religious traditions countenance polygamy, there is no sanction. In a
peculiar mirroring, Hindus in Bangladesh and Pakistan can marry an unlimited
number of wives but Muslims are restricted to no more than four. In India,
Hindus can no longer marry more than one wife legally. See infra note 132 and
accompanying text.
125. See GORDON, supra note 62, at 30 ("In the 1850s, fiction was a valuable
tool for bringing home to readers the fear of betrayal and spiritual desolation that
novelists claimed were the consequences of polygamy."). See generally Leonard J.
Arrington & John Haupt, Intolerable Zion: The Image of Mormonism in
Nineteenth Century American Literature, 22 W. HUMAN. REV. 243 (1968); Karen
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fantasy that women were either being forced into lives of

virtual slavery or seduced by notions of sexual freedom into
lives of whoredom. 126 The victimization of women was and
continues to be a key element to the abolitionist argument. 127
Politicizing victimization, the writers of the nineteenth century
also argued that democracy could only flourish in a
monogamous household where fidelity to one partner was the
norm. 28 They argued that polygamy, akin to adultery, was a
faithless institution leading to despotism (as evidenced,
according to these writers, by the actions of the Mormon
Patriarchs).129
In this history of the federal regulation of marriage, we see
the kind of conscriptional secularism described above at work.
The idea that Mormon difference could be accommodated was
met with the fear that the difference would entirely undermine
the state, and that the courts had to strictly impose "shared"
civic values and punish transgressions through criminal law.
American identity is forged through assimilation or the
privatization of difference within certain constraints. Lawrence
v. Texas may have sparked conversations about both spatial
and decisional privacy with regard to adult, consensual sexual
relationships, but as State v. Holm shows, it did not puncture
the abolitionist armor when it comes to the public regulation of

Lynn, Sensational Virtue: Nineteenth-Century Mormon Fiction and American
PopularTaste, DIALOGUE, Autumn 1981, at 101.
126. See GORDON, supra note 62, at 29-40. Some examples of anti-polygamist
novels are ORVILLA S. BELISLE, THE PROPHETS; OR, MORMONISM UNVEILED
(Phila., Wm. White Smith 1855); ALFREDA EVA BELL, BOADICEA; THE MORMON
WIFE: LIFE-SCENES IN UTAH (Baltimore, Arthur R. Orton 1855); METTA VICTORIA
FULLER, MORMON WIVES; A NARRATIVE OF FACTS STRANGER THAN FICTION
(N.Y.C., Derby & Jackson 1856); and MARIA WARD, FEMALE LIFE AMONG THE
MORMONS; A NARRATIVE OF MANY YEARS' PERSONAL EXPERIENCE (N.Y.C., J.C.
Derby 1855).
127. See, e.g., PARASHAR, supra note 9, at 136.

128. See sources cited supra note 126.
129. As Illinois State Representative Shelby Moore Collum said in 1870:
Polygamy . . . is regarded by the civilized world as opposed to law and
order, decency and Christianity, and the prosperity of the state.
Polygamy has gone hand [in] hand with murder, idolatry, and every
secret abomination. .

.

. Instead of being a holy principle, receiving the

sanction of Heaven, it is an institution founded in lustful and unbridled
passions of men, devised by Satan himself to destroy purity and
authorize whoredom.
PHILIP L. KILBRIDE, PLURAL MARRIAGE FOR OUR TIMES: A REINVENTED OPTION?
70 (1994) (quoting 8 M. MILLER, GREAT DEBATES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 443

(1913)).
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marriage. 130 Even the privatization of this practice, in which
adults consent to enter a polygamous union and where none is
harmed, is beyond accommodation when marriage is itself
defined in law through the dominant cultural and religious
tradition. 131
B. India:Reform and Accommodation
The tendency toward abolition of polygamy is also present
in India. This tendency has existed since the colonial period
when the imperial authority attempted to define family law in
order to simplify and ease the administration of a complex,
heterogeneous population. The British imperial administration
formally banned polygamy in the Indian Penal Code of 1860 for
those communities in which it was not a traditional practice. 132
The British made an exception for Hindus and Muslims whose
personal laws recognized plural marriages as valid. 133 While
the British were interested in reforming Hindu law and did so,
the Indian Rebellion of 1857 made the British reformers
question whether the beneficiaries of these laws would meekly
allow their traditions and religious beliefs to be reformed from
the outside without protest.'14 Moreover, family form was of
lesser concern than more serious social issues like sati or
widow remarriage. 135 On the other hand, the British considered

130. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
131. Recent polygamy scholarship has pressed this point. The idea that
polygamy inevitably results in the perpetuation of gender inequality has been
challenged. Moreover, despite complementarity's many critics, even in monogamy,
there are proponents of that arrangement between the sexes rather than equality,
the idea being that partners in a marriage may arrange the division of labor in
the family in a manner that best suits them. However, one must be cautious about
such doctrines where they attempt to hide a reversion to stereotypical gender
roles and constrain the choice of partners into what is considered "appropriate"
roles. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 15; see also Michele Alexandre, Big Love: Is
Feminist Polygamy an Oxymoron or a True Possibility?, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN'S
L.J. 3,14, 28 (2007).
132. INDIA PEN. CODE (1860), ch. XX, art. 494; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, No.
25, Acts of Parliament, 1955 (India).
133. See PEN. ch. XX; see also W. MORGAN & A.G. MACPHERSON, THE INDIAN
PENAL CODE, (ACT XLV OF 1860,) WITH NOTES 433 (Calcutta, G.C. Hay & Co.
1861) (noting that the Code prohibited polygamy in those religions in which it is
not supported by tradition).
134. See Choudhury, supra note 34, at 54-56.
135. See Varsha Chitnis & Danaya Wright, The Legacy of Colonialism: Law
and Women's Rights in India,64 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1315, 1323-24 (2007).
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Muslim law to be more progressive and did not meddle in quite
the same manner with that community.136
Werner Menski argues that the modernist factions within
Indian society working at the state level before independence
were the impetus for reform of polygamy.13 7 Indeed, the
nascent women's organizations that were starting to work on
the advancement of Indian women were a key group that
pushed for the legislation at the state level. The principality of
Baroda was the first state to formally ban polygamy after
receiving support from the Hindu religious establishment. 13 8
Polygamy abolition then took place in a piecemeal fashion, with
other states following. The Bombay Prevention of Hindu
Bigamous Marriages Act of 1946 is perhaps the most wellknown enactment that preceded the federal legislation postindependence.139 The case testing that enactment's validity has
become a cornerstone of polygamy jurisprudence in India.
In NarasuAppa Mali, the High Court of Bombay was faced
with a constitutional challenge to the Bombay legislation. 140 In
its decision, the court came to a conclusion similar to that of
Reynolds and Cleveland in upholding the criminalization of
bigamy for Hindus. 14 1 However, the court also found that the
prohibition did not violate equal protection by treating Hindu
males differently from Muslim males.142 The case is intriguing
because the justices had the unenviable task of reconciling
support for the ban for the Hindu population-despite ample
evidence that polygamy is a religiously sanctioned practicewhile arguing that no such ban was required for Muslims.
In Narasu Appa Mali, a Hindu man was criminally
convicted of violating the Bombay Prevention of Hindu
Bigamous Marriages Act 1946.143 He challenged the law,
claiming that it was a violation of his fundamental rights
guaranteed by Articles 14, 15, and 25 of the Indian
Constitution. 4 4 The High Court of Bombay, citing the U.S.

136.

See Flavia Agnes, Economic Rights of Women in Islamic Law, 31 EcON. &

POL. WKLY. 2832, 2832-33 (1996).
137. See WERNER F. MENSKI, HINDU LAW: BEYOND TRADITION AND MODERNITY

383-89
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

143.
144.

(2003).
Id. at 385.
State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, A.I.R. 1952 Bom. 84,
Id.
Id.
11, 15.
Id.
8-12.
Id. TT 1, 16.
Id. IT 3-8.

18 (India).
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Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Beason,145 held that a
"sharp distinction must be drawn between religious faith and
belief and religious practices."1 46 The High Court of Bombay
held that under Article 25(a)(b), the state is empowered to
change the personal laws of Hindus as a measure of social
reform. 147 In fact, the Act did not discriminate against Hindus
because they were the beneficiaries of a positive reform toward
progress and modernity. 148 The counterargument-that if
Hindus are given this benefit, then denying Muslims the same
would amount to discrimination against Muslims-was
unavailing. The Court reasoned that in the Muslim community,
"polygamy is recognised as a valid institution,"1 49 and that the
Indian Constitution recognizes distinct communities and
different conceptions of marriage and divorce among religious
groups. Whereas a social reform might be advisable for one
community, other communities may not be ready for it.150
At least in this decision, the formal persistence of
polygamy is the only intimation that Muslim difference
amounts to a lack of progression into modernity. The High
Court of Bombay did not indulge in the kind of disparaging
dicta that the U.S. Supreme Court did in its early polygamy
cases.15 1 Though the characterization of the bigamy law (a
benefit to the Hindu community) may seem very convenient
and somewhat peculiar, the decision shows an understanding
of social facts that the state may take into consideration when
devising its reform agenda. The High Court of Bombay

145. Id. 5. In Davis v. Beason, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld laws that
restricted the ability of polygamists to hold public office. 133 U.S. 333, 345 (1890).
In the Indian context, a similar case arose in Javed v. State of Haryana,in which
a Muslim man challenged a law prohibiting a person with more than two children
from running for political office. In the case, the Supreme Court of India held that
population control was a key government interest and that even though the law
might disparately impact polygamous Muslim men who are likely to have more
than two children and also women who might not be able to fully control their
reproduction, the law was constitutional. Javed v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 2003
S.C. 3057, IT 18, 44, 60 (India).
146. Narasu Appa Mali, A.I.R. 1952, 5.
147. Id. 13.
148. Id.
149. Id. 10.
150. Id.
151. For instance, in U.S. jurisprudence, ongoing moral condemnation of
practitioners of polygamy as "promiscuous" and destructive of the fabric of social
life and law and order is common. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
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recognized that the incremental approach taken by the state is
a result of diversity within the state. 152
Regarding the claim that polygamy is a form of sex
discrimination, Justice Gajendragadkar asserted in his
concurrence in Narasu Appa Mali that a law permitting
polygamy is not sex discrimination within the ambit of Article
15(1) unless the basis for discrimination is sex alone and refers
to no other "reasonable ground." 5 3 Marriage as a social
institution is a result of contemporary conditions; it reflects the
"natural" differences between sexes, and considerations may
legitimately arise from these differences. 154 Unfortunately, the
justice did not go on to explain how the differences
undergirding polygyny are legitimate in a modern state with a
constitutional guarantee of sex equality (should there be
polyandry?) without resorting to some sort of biological
difference argument.
In contrast to Reynolds' dubious concern for women, the
Bombay High Court was unconcerned about the claimed
unequal treatment of Muslim women as "victims" of
polygamy.1 55 The Court, however, recognized that Hindu
women would not be forthcoming in prosecuting their
husbands. As such, the anti-bigamy law had to be crafted to be
cognizable and non-compoundable and thereby not reliant on
wives' complaints. 156 This would allow the police to enforce the
152. See NarasuAppa Mali, A.I.R. 1952, 10. Chief Justice Chagla noted:
One community might be prepared to accept and work social reform;
another may not yet be prepared for it; and Article 11 does not lay down
that any legislation that the State may embark upon must necessarily be
of an all-embracing character. The State may rightly decide to bring
about social reform by stages and the stages may be territorial or they
may be community wise.
Id.
153. Id. T 24 (Gajendragadkar, J., concurring).
154. Id.
155. The issue of sex discrimination is cursorily treated in one paragraph at
the very end of the majority opinion and is simply dismissed as irrelevant. See id.
1 14 (majority opinion).
156. See id. 11. A cognizable offense is one in which the police can institute
an investigation and file a First Information Report without a court order and
arrest without a warrant, typically for serious crimes. A non-compoundable
offense is one that cannot be settled privately. INDIA CODE CRIM. PROC. ch. 1, § 2
(1973) (defining different types of offenses). The Bombay Prevention of Hindu
Bigamous Marriages Act, No. 25, Acts of Parliament, 1946 (India), was
superseded by the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, No. 25, Acts of Parliament, 1955
(India), and the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973, section 494 makes the
offense bailable (punishable by seven years' imprisonment or fewer), noncognizable (requiring a warrant issued by the court), and compoundable, except in
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bigamy laws without the help of wives. While the succeeding
legislative acts have made the nature of the crime less severe
by only prosecuting the violation if a wife complains,
subsequent cases at the state level have repeatedly upheld the
polygamy ban for Hindus while finding it permissible for
Muslims. 15 7 In sum, Narasu Appa Mali has become the
definitive case upholding the validity of the dual treatment of
polygamy in India.
In the years after independence, the Indian federal
legislature banned polygamy for the Hindu majority. 158 The
Hindu Marriage Act of 1955 (HMA) formally abolished
polygamy for the Hindu community throughout the Indian
territories. 159 The HMA provides:
A marriage may be solemnized between any two hindus, if
the following conditions are fulfilled, namely:(i) neither party has a spouse living at the time of the
marriage .... 160
Where a second marriage takes place, the HMA essentially
applies the relevant sections of the Indian Penal Code of 1860
on bigamy to Hindus.16 1 However, in order for the marriage to
Andhra Pradesh, where it has been made harsher, CRIM. PROC. § 494; see also
LAW COMM'N OF INDIA, NO. 227, PREVENTING BIGAMY VIA CONVERSION TO
IsLAM-A PROPOSAL FOR GIVING STATUTORY EFFECT TO SUPREME COURT

RULINGS 14-15 (2009), available at http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/
report227.pdf.
157. See, e.g., Sambireddy v. Jayamma, A.I.R. 1972 A.P. 156 (India); Aiyer v.
Amma, 78 A.I.R. 1952 Mad. 193 (India) (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145 (1878)).
158. Hindu Marriage Act § 5(i).
159.

Id.

160. Id.
161. Chapter XX, section 494 of the Indian Penal Code of 1860 (titled
"Marrying again during lifetime of husband or wife") reads:
Whoever, having a husband or wife living, marries in any case in
which such marriage is void by reason of its taking place during the life
of such husband or wife, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be
liable to fine.
Exception-This section does not extend to any person whose
marriage with such husband or wife has been declared void by a court of
competent jurisdiction, nor to any person who contracts a marriage
during the life of a former husband or wife, if such husband or wife, at
the time of the subsequent marriage, shall have been continually absent
from such person for the space of seven years, and shall not have been
heard of by such person as being alive within that time provided the
person contracting such subsequent marriage shall, before such
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be legally valid, it must conform to the customary rituals that
Hinduism prescribes. 162 Bigamous marriages that do not
formally meet these requirements are not recognized as legal
marriages under Hindu personal law. Unlike the Utah law, the
HMVA recognizes only the formal requirements in finding a
second marriage. If the formalities have not been met, there is
no marriage under a literal reading of the HMA. 163 As a result,
a properly solemnized second marriage is void ab initio and
triggers the criminal sanctions, but a defective marriage that
does not meet the legal requirements does not trigger criminal
penalties even if the husband cohabits with the second wife. 164
Both before and after independence, during the formative
years of the Indian state, the battle lines between Hindu and
Muslim communities were drawn. 165 Muslims were concerned
about the majority's power to legislate away their personal
laws, which had increasingly become part of an Indian-Muslim
identity.16 6 Following the British example, the Indian
government chose not to undertake a lengthy conflict over
Thus, while
family law with its largest minority group.
Muslims (and tribal peoples) have had the practice of polygamy
protected via personal law, this protection has generated a
continued countermovement to eradicate polygamy entirely. 16 8
The activism against polygamy has been largely focused on
Muslims. The anti-polygamy stance has resulted in some
strange interest convergences, particularly between secular

marriage takes place, inform the person with whom such marriage is
contracted ....

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE
Punishment-Imprisonment for 7 years and fine-Non-cognizableBailable-Triable by Magistrate of the first class-Compoundable by the
husband or wife of the person so marrying with the permission of the
court.
162. See MENSKI, supra note 137, at 398 (discussing Ram v. Himachal Pradesh
Administration, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 614 (India), where the Supreme Court of India
reiterated its stance in Lokhande v. State of Maharashtra,A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1564
(India), that a bigamy conviction could not be sustained in the absence of the
performance of essential ceremonies in a Hindu marriage). Compare this to the
statute in Utah under attack in Holm, where anyone who "purports to marry"
would be guilty of bigamy. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
163. See Hindu Marriage Act § 5.
164. See MENSIG, supra note 137, at 398.
165. See Choudhury, supra note 34, at 56-59.
166. Id. at 61.
167. Id. at 67.
168. Id. at 79 (explaining that both Hindu right-wing groups and feminist
groups have found themselves on the same side against Muslim polygamy).
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women's rights advocates and right-wing Hindu politicians. 169
In spite of the opposition to Muslim polygamy by some groups,
there is also a countervailing position demanding recognition
for religious pluralism that prevents the Indian federal
government from enacting a blanket criminalization of
polygamous marriages across communities. 170 Largely, that
position has been adopted by traditional Muslims seeking to
retain group autonomy within the state, but it has also found
some acceptance within the judiciary and the state. As a result,
while Hindu law was reformed, Muslim personal law has been
frozen in time, with the clock stopping in 1938.171
As discussed above, the issue of polygamy continues to be a
bone of contention between some Hindu and Muslim groups
and between women's organizations and traditional religious
leaders. It is a complex issue. In the 1980s and 1990s, the
Hindu Right used the issue to push for a Uniform Civil Code,

arguing that the disparate treatment privileged Muslim
men. 17 Women's rights groups have long championed the
aspirational goal of a uniform family law enshrined as a
hortatory provision in Article 44 of the Indian Constitution.173
They strategically claimed that the Muslim personal law
subordinated Muslim women. Both groups, though for
markedly different reasons, sought the abolition of personal

169. Id. The BJP and feminists agree that polygamy is bad but for entirely
different reasons. Whereas the Hindu Right has argued to abolish polygamy
because it is a "benefit" that is given to Muslim men but not Hindus, feminists
have argued that formal laws allowing for polygamy enshrine the subordination of
Muslim women. Id. at 69-77.
170. See Khan, supra note 12, at 160 ("It is, therefore, religiously not
permissible to abolish polygamy altogether. And what is not allowed religiously
should not be legally done.").
171. The current family law statute for Muslims in India is the Muslim
Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 1937. While this law has not been
codified, it would be misleading to say that no development of the law has taken
place. Judicial interpretation and activism has moved some areas of the law to be
more responsive to the needs of women in the Muslim community. See generally
Narendra Subramanian, Legal Change and Gender Inequality: Changes in
Muslim Family Law in India, 33 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 631 (2008).
172. See Cossman & Kapur, supranote 46, at 147.
173. See RAJAN, supra note 45, at 156-65. Article 44 reads: "The State shall
endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory
of India." INDIA CONST. art. 44. As a directive principle, it is not law. As Article 37
states, "[t]he provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by any
court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the
governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these
principles in making laws." Id. at art. 37.
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laws and with it polygamy. 17 4 However, these factions have not
prevailed.
Any attempt to reform Muslim personal law by the state
has been met with vigorous and entrenched resistance. 175 That
said, internal reforms undertaken by Muslim groups have
made some inroads. 176 Much ink has been expended on Muslim
polygamy and its effects on women and families. 17 7 Indeed, it
seems one cannot discuss polygamy in India without
considering Muslim and Hindu practices as though the two are
somehow coupled. While the topic of Muslim polygamy
certainly has not been exhausted, the focus of this Section is
not on the minority, which continues to "enjoy" the formal right
to plural wives. Rather, the salient point here is that the
Indian government was able to enact a nationwide ban on
polygamy for Hindus with relative ease due to the considerable
movement toward that end in the states. The prospects for a
sweeping reform of Muslim personal law, by comparison, are
bleak.
In the Indian context, legal reform has been complicated
by the tension between uniformity and the push for a Uniform
Civil Code on one hand and the tolerance for legal pluralism
that continues to accommodate various religious family law
regimes on the other. Despite the ability of the Indian federal
government to reform Hindu personal law, it has not resulted
in the eradication of polygamy in that community. 178 By
contrast, the legal landscape in the United States is far more
uniform even after the repeal of the federal laws on polygamy.
The states' legislative approach of criminalizing bigamy is
comparable to the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955. Yet the uniform
criminalization of bigamy in the United States has not led to
174. See Choudhury, supra note 34, at 77.
175. Id. at 78.
176. See India Muslim Divorce Code Set Out, BBC NEWS (May 2, 2005, 7:05
AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilsouth-asia/4504889.stm; Geeta Pandey, Muslim
Women Fight Instant Divorce, BBC NEWS (Aug. 4, 2004, 6:25 AM), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilsouthasia/3530608.stm; Balraj Puri, Nikahnama-A Reply to
Triple Talaq, DECCAN HERALD (Aug. 13, 2004), http://archive.deccanherald.com/
Deccanheraldlaugl32004/edst.asp.
177. See generally THE DIVERSITY OF MUSLIM WOMEN'S LIVES IN INDIA (Zoya
Hasan & Ritu Menon eds., 2005); ZOYA HASAN & RITU MENON, UNEQUAL
CITIZENS: A STUDY OF MUSLIM WOMEN IN INDIA (2004); SHAHIDA LATEEF,
MUSLIM WOMEN IN INDIA-POLITICAL AND PRIVATE REALITIES: 1890s-1980s
(1990); VRINDA NARAIN, RECLAIMING THE NATION: MUSLIM WOMEN AND THE LAW
IN INDIA (2008); Alexandre, supra note 131.
178. GOPIKA SOLANKI, ADJUDICATION IN RELIGIOUS FAMILY LAWS: CULTURAL
ACCOMMODATION, LEGAL PLURALISM, AND GENDER EQUALITY IN INDIA 116 (2011).
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the end of the practice either. Despite the ambivalent result of
family law reform, we are not left bereft of options for
regulation. Before I assess these options, I want to explore a
few of the more important features of these laws in India and
the United States.
III. COMPARATIVE LESSONS: NARRATIVES OF PROGRESS,
WOMEN'S EQUALITY, AND RELIGIOUS ASSIMILATION AND
ACCOMMODATION
To a large extent, the social and political realities reflected
in the secular framework existing in each country help explain
their respective legislative approaches to polygamy regulation.
In India, an existing, politically powerful, Muslim minority
resisted any interference with pre-independence laws that
permitted minorities to practice polygamy.179 As a result, the
Indian federal government targeted the majority population
rather than the minority. In the United States, the Mormon
minority became powerful in the cradle of an already existing
dominant social and political context with a markedly
Protestant valence.1 8 0 On the heels of the Civil War and during
the growth of federal power, the U.S. federal government forced
Mormons to assimilate in a way that was improbable in India
one hundred years later.
In this Part, I highlight similarities and differences in
polygamy regulation beyond the formal laws described above.
Three aspects are of particular note: First, in both countries,
the justification for polygamy regulation includes a discourse
about progress and modernity. In this discourse, polygamy is
construed as a backward and uncivilized practice, whereas

179. See Choudhury, supra note 34, at 93-96.
180. While there were, of course, groups that were entirely different from the
dominant group-such as the Native American nations, African-Americans,
Chinese-Americans, and Japanese-Americans-none of these groups was able to
define the social, political, or legal system. They were all subject to it without
franchise. Native Americans were given the right to vote with the Indian
Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1401 (2006)). The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)), prohibited discriminatory voting
practices that were responsible for the disenfranchisement of African-Americans.
These discriminatory practices included literacy tests, poll taxes, grandfather
clauses, and Jim Crow laws. Id. The Magnuson Act of 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600,
repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, which had
effectively blocked Chinese immigrants from entering the United States and
prohibited settled Chinese immigrants from obtaining U.S. citizenship.
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monogamy is a mark of modernity. In both contexts, there is an
underlying racial discourse at play that constructs polygamy as
an inferior choice of family form. Second, in a related discourse,
women's groups take up a modernist position claiming that
polygamy subordinates women. Thus, as a matter of equality,
polygamy must be abolished.18 Further, women's groups have
also adopted the racial construction of polygamy as part of the
practices of "inferior" peoples latently, if not overtly. 8 2 Finally,
one area of difference between the two countries' approaches to
marriage regulation is the willingness of the state to tolerate
some form of polygamy in society under the protection of
religious rights. In particular, the Indian judicial approach to
enforcing the Hindu polygamy ban is more nuanced than that
of the United States. As such, competing visions of modernity
coexist. While the social conditions are quite different, the
ability of Indian courts to regulate different family forms holds
some interest for scholars of U.S. family law struggling with
challenges to the dominant conceptions of family.
A.

Discoursesof Progress:Monogamy = Modernity?

The narratives of progress that surround reform of law in
general have also had their corollary in the reform of family
law. Despite a long history of the coexistence of monogamy and
polygamy in societies stretching from Asia to Europe,
monogamy has emerged as the hallmark of a modern family.

181.

See generally PARASHAR, supra note 9.

182.

This sentiment is obvious in other contexts

as well. For instance,

Geetanjali Gangoli has found that racial and communal bias in women's
organizations dominated by the elite majority is rife with assumptions about
Muslim women. She quotes a Hindu social worker in domestic violence who
expresses the view that Muslim women have a "very low status": "This is because
their religion gives more status to men. (Muslim) men can easily give 'talaq' and
desert women. Muslim women are more oppressed and vulnerable (than Hindu
women). Their oppression is sanctioned by their religion." GEETANJALI GANGOLI,
INDIAN FEMINISMS: LAW, PATRIARCHIES AND VIOLENCE IN INDIA 111 (2007)

(alterations in original). She further notes:
[S]uch images of Muslim men as being rapacious, bigamous and violent
are based on communal perceptions of Muslim communities, and in cases
of feminist intervention, leads [sic] to a belief that Muslim women are
fated to suffer. This is apparent in this response of a Hindu social worker
to a battered woman who had approached her through a feminist
collective in which Muslim women play a significant role, where the
worker is reported to suggest that domestic violence was inevitable in a
context where men were allowed to be polygamous.
Id.

1002

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

Moreover, the nuclear monogamous family has moved from
communal to individual and from status to contract, thus
exemplifying "modernity." In the United States, this
construction of "monogamy = modernity" while "polygamy =
barbarism" is explicit in the case law and debates surrounding
the legislation against the Mormon Church. In the various
polygamy judgments discussed above, the idea that a modern,
democratic society cannot support polygamy is so self-evident
that supporters do not have to defend it except tautologically
(i.e., polygamy is not consistent with modernity because it is
backwards).
In the United States of the 1800s, polygamy was one of the
"twin relics of barbarism" (the other being slavery).1 83 As
Gordon notes:
In nineteenth-century American thought barbarism
occupied a special, un-Christian place. It constituted the
inversion of progress, a Manichean counterweight to its
successor, civilization. Native cultures and their "savage"
customs made barbarism more than an abstract concept for
most Americans. Popular fear of "Indian barbarisms" fed
insecurities about the vulnerability of civilization, especially
private relations of property and marriage, which were the

cornerstones of civilized societies. 1 84

Those who practiced polygamy were immediately "othered" into
inferior, less civilized groups of people. In the United States,
this betrayal was keenly felt because it was race-traitorous. 185
As noted by the Reynolds Court, whites were not supposed to
act like the "Asiatic" or "African" races.
In India-a decidedly Asiatic place-similar discourses
about civilization were circulating, particularly among the
educated elites influenced by British Liberalism. 186 In the
broader context of the civilizing mission of the colonial
authorities, a push to reform the most regressive social
customs was undertaken. Legal reform resulted in passing
laws banning sati and child marriage and allowing remarriage

183.
184.

See GORDON, supra note 62, at 55.
Id. at 56.

185.

See Ertman, supra note 63, at 308.

186.

See Rachel Struman, Marriage and Family in Colonial Hindu Law, in

HINDUISM AND LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 89, 89-104 (Timothy Lubin et al. eds.,
2010).
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of Hindu widows. 187 While the colonial authorities did not
directly tackle polygamy, there was a social movement already
underway that took up the cause.18 8 At the time of
independence, the modernists pushed for the wholesale ban on
plural marriage backed by Mahatma Gandhi.18 9 As a result,
the enactments banning Hindu polygamy happened piecemeal
on a state-by-state basis before a federal ban was enacted. 190
The modernist position against polygamy was eventually folded
into the feminist position by women's groups who subsequently
took up the abolitionist cause, advocated for more robust
criminal prosecution, and continue to argue that the laws are
insufficiency enforced. 19 1
In sum, in both the Indian and U.S. contexts, polygamy
opponents depicted the practice as premodern and oppressive,
one that would be better off as a historical relic. Without an
explicit explanation of why monogamy is modern, we are left
with the assumption that it is due to its dyadic form, which
allows for equality between partners. However, such an
assumption both glosses over many of the injustices within
monogamous families and deterministically conflates form with
substance. It is worth recalling that until recent times,
monogamous marriages allowed for much the same kinds of
inequalities found in polygamous families. For instance, in the
twentieth century, women in monogamous marriages could
only divorce if they had fault grounds, husbands still had the
right to chastise their wives physically (although not violently),
women were unable to contract freely because of coverture,
and, because title was dispositive in property settlement,
women had little access to marital property. 2 Women shared
187. See generally RINA VERMA WILLIAMS, POSTCOLONIAL POLITICS AND
PERSONAL LAWS: COLONIAL LEGAL LEGACIES AND THE INDIAN STATE (2006).

188.

See generally id.

189. Id. at 385.
190. See MENSKI, supra note 137, at 103.
191. Id. at 410 (quoting VIJAY SHARMA, PROTECTION TO WOMEN IN
MATRIMONIAL HOME 95 (1994), on the inefficacy of the judiciary and law
enforcement in tackling bigamy).
192. See STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY 10 (2005); NANCY F. COTT,
PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 11-12 (2000). See
generally KATHLEEN S. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: WOMEN AND
RIGHTS DISCOURSE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2007). It should also be
noted that domestic violence within monogamous marriages and the challenges to
the public/private distinction in family law became a rallying point among
feminists in the 1970s and 1980s. Prior to that, the state's willingness to
prosecute what was seen as a private matter was minimal. See LEIGH GOODMARK,
A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 107-10
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these burdens regardless of the marital form in which they
found themselves. Nevertheless, it is the women and children
in plural marriages that are of particular concern. For
instance, they are referred to in the Reynolds case despite the
incongruity of the Court's concern for this group of women in
plural marriages, distinguishing them from their monogamous
sisters who suffered many of the same harms alleged to be the
effects of polygamy.193

B.

Women's Equality, Race/Religion, and Sex in the
Polygamy Debate

In more recent decades, the debate about ongoing practices
of polygam has centered on its negative effects on women and
children. 19 While recent feminist positions are much more
(2012). See generally ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST
LAWMAKING (2000).

193. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring):
Justice Bradley noted:
It certainly cannot be affirmed, as an historical fact, that this has ever
been established as one of the fundamental privileges and immunities of
the sex. On the contrary, the civil law, as well as nature herself, has
always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and
destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman's protector
and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which
belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations
of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is founded
in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and
functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interest
and views which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is
repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent
career from that of her husband. So firmly fixed was this sentiment in
the founders of the common law that it became a maxim of that system
of jurisprudence that a woman had no legal existence separate from her
husband, who was regarded as her head and representative in the social
state; and, notwithstanding some recent modifications of this civil status,
many of the special rules of law flowing from and dependent upon this
cardinal principle still exist in full force in most States. One of these is,
that a married woman is incapable, without her husband's consent, of
making contracts which shall be binding on her or him. This very
incapacity was one circumstance which the Supreme Court of Illinois
deemed important in rendering a married woman incompetent fully to
perform the duties and trusts that belong to the office of an attorney and
counsellor.
Id.
194. Even though Emily Duncan calls for legalization of polygamy, she singles
out women and children as the subjects of the beneficial regulation when
polygamy is brought out of the closet and into the state's regulatory grasp. Emily
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nuanced, and include those who sufggest that there might be a
feminist pro-polygamy argument, 19 there is still a strong antipolygamy critique that can be linked to the historical antipathy
to Mormon polygamy.196 Sarah Barringer Gordon explored indepth the historical role that women novelists had on the
debates on polygamy in the nineteenth century. 197 The
prevalent view then was that monogamous marriage was
infused with morality, the self-sacrifice of committed partners
versus licentiousness, political stability, uniformity as opposed
to chaotic difference, and justice and order over criminality.
Women were alternatively described as victims of rapacious
Mormon men or whores willing to enter into "free-love"
relationships.19 8 At stake was the very nature of women and
their relationship to sex. Gordon is worth quoting at length.
Speaking about second wives, she notes:
Single women were frequently depicted as complicit in the
tragedy. The potential for real moral difference between
women was among the most nagging and relentless of the
problems that plagued popular fiction. The glorification of
the household and its "guardian angel" was undermined by
the presence of women whose morals defied the claim that
women were by nature monogamous. The infidel Fanny
Wright had proved earlier in the century that women could
be tempted away from the "home of liberty." Novelist Maria
Ward described one aspiring Mormon wife as a "coquette,"
who was in part culpable "for the continuation of polygamy
because [she] preferred a rih man, with a dozen wives, to a
poor one without any . . . ."

If women in polygamous unions were considered unchaste and
wayward, the depiction of Mormon men was nothing short of
predatory. Polygamy, then, is portrayed as an institution that
permits men to give free rein to their sexual desires and
lasciviousness.
J. Duncan, The Positive Effects of Legalizing Polygamy: "Love Is a Many
Splendored Thing," 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 315, 316 (2008) ("Thus, if
there is to be a rational policy in this area, it should consider the legalization of
polygamy, thereby allowing greater regulation of the practice, compelling
polygynous communities to emerge from the shadows, and openly assisting the
women and children who live in them.").
195. Id.; see also Alexandre, supra note 131, at 5.
196. See infra note 200.
197. See GORDON, supra note 62, at 29-53.
198. See id. at 42-43.
199. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
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Over one hundred years after Reynolds, the regulation and
prosecution of polygamy continues to be accom anied by a
discourse of protecting women and children.2 0 Without a
doubt, there are concerns about some polygamist communities
that engage in illegal activity, such as sex with minors.
However, marriages in such communities do not represent
polygamous unions in general, just as abusive monogamous
marriages do not define monogamy. Nor are such activities
evidence that polygamy inevitably leads to abuse. The feminist
marriages
in polygamous
abuse
with
preoccupation
conveniently ignores the reality that women are vulnerable in
the home regardless of family form.
Another liberal feminist concern-most often expressed
these days in critiques of Muslim polygamy-focuses on
equality. 2 1 The conflation of a dyadic family form with
equality, as I have already argued above, is anything but
evident. Nevertheless, the idea that women might have equal
power and decision-making capabilities within a polygamous
family where there is one husband and multiple wives is met
with skepticism. 202 The logic behind this view is that the
distribution of power must take place strictly along gender
lines. For instance, if in a dyadic relationship power is
allocated equally, both parties get fifty percent. Yet, in a plural
family, the assumption seems to be that the husband gets fifty
percent-or sometimes even more-while the wives must share
the remaining fifty percent among them. Those who challenge
this assumption have suggested a more democratic form in
which each member has an equal share (in which case, the
single male is outnumbered). 2 03

200. In recent literature discussing polygamy, the focus squarely remains on
women; this is true for both scholarly work and case law. See supra note 194; see
also Cynthia T. Cook, Polygyny: Did the Africans Get It Right?, 38 J. BLACK STUD.
232, 239-40 (2007) (arguing that polygyny is harmful to the health and well-being
of women and children despite its benefits on fertility and population).
201. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN? AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUES 129 (2006); Rebecca J. Cook, Structures of
Discrimination,28 MACALESTER INT'L J. 33, 46-49 (2011); Strassberg, supra note
8, at 1535-37, 1586-94. I attended a family law conference in 2008 during which a
discussion of current issues in family law took place. At one point, in the plenary
session, one of the scholars made a statement to the effect of "we don't want
polygamy," indicating a widespread agreement on the undesirability of the
practice.
202. See sources cited supra note 201; cf. Davis, supra note 15, at 1990-91.
203. Shayna M. Sigman, Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy Is Wrong,
16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101, 177 (2006).
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Another equality problem arises with regard to a woman's
right to marry multiple men. It is argued that in a legal system
that affords equal protection of the laws and prohibits arbitrary
gender discrimination, polygamy would have to be equally
available for both men and women. 204 Modern ideas of multiple
partners make this a real possibility. In some sense, new
formations like polyamorous partnerships that supposedly
evade the historical gender inequities garner feminist support
more easily than does the historically existing polygamous
one.2 0 5
The typical discourse that arranges feminism and
multiculturalism in dualistic, oppositional ways, pitting
women's rights against cultural rights as though the
boundaries are easily definable, is changing. 2 06 Recent
literature suggests an opening up and questioning of the
possibility of gender-equitable forms of polygamy, at least in
the United States.2 0 7 Part of that opening is the understanding
that the deep moral repugnance against having multiple
partners has been eroded by an increasingly permissive society
that values personal choice and sexual expression. 20 8 Thus, as
long as adults exercise meaningful choice, the law should leave
them well enough alone. Certainly, as Elizabeth Emens has
argued, plural relationships can be principled rather than
simply licentious.2 0 9
In the Indian context, polygamy reform was similarly
bound up in the progress narrative and the demands of
modernity. The current discourses pitting Muslims against
204. See MIRIAM KOKTVEDGAARD ZEITZEN, POLYGAMY: A CROSS-CULTURAL
ANALYSIS 125 (2008).

205.

See Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy's Law: Compulsory Monogamy and

Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277, 302, 325 (2004).
206. See generally SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS,
RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS (2004); WENDY BROWN, REGULATING AVERSION:
TOLERANCE IN THE AGE OF IDENTITY AND EMPIRE (2006); WENDY BROWN, STATES
OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY (1995).

207. Susan Moller Okin's book has become a mainstay of this kind of inquiry.
The seeming conflict and attempts to resolve it have been an ongoing
preoccupation of feminists. See generally SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, IS
MULTICULTURALISM
BAD
FOR WOMEN?
(1999);
AYELET
SHACHAR,
MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS

(2001).
208. For example, the laws punishing fornication and adultery are falling by
the wayside because of desuetude. And given that there is rarely prosecution of
such extramarital relationships, what substantive difference is there between a
man who keeps a long-term mistress while being married and polygamy other
than, in the latter case, the first wife knows of the existence of the second?
209. See Emens, supra note 205, at 320-30.
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Hindus are often laden with ideas of Muslim backwardness
because polygamy remains a legal institution and is equated
with the mistreatment of women. 2 10 Moreover, Muslim
traditionalists have issued apology after apology for the
practice, claiming that it is morally superior to serial
monogamy or infidelity without tackling the real issue of
women's roles in polygamy brought up by its feminist critics. 2 11
Consequently, Indian feminists' concerns about polygamy
center less on sexual fidelity, morality, or sexual expression
than on economic and gender subordination. 2 12 Society has
primarily depicted women in polygamous marriages as victims
and not freely-choosing agents (which at least the "whores" in
the Mormon victim/whore dichotomy were). The attention has
been particularly focused on Muslim women and their
subordination at the hands of patriarchal Muslim men. 2 13
However, Hindu women have also been cast in the victim
role. 2 14 In a relatively recent post about polygamy, Deepali
Gaur Singh writes that:
Multiple marriages have socially and legally punished
women rather than men. The Bigamy Law has been under
cloud for some time especially since the Supreme Court
passed a decision that women in substantially long live-in
relationships should be given the same rights as a legally
wedded wife. This was to protect the second wife who under
the bigamy law loses all rights since the marriage is
considered null and void in the absence of the dissolution of
the former. Besides, in the event of the death of the spouse
the family often disinherited them since the marriage would
not be legally recognized. And with uneducated women very
often duped into such marriages or unable to get out of
them for fear of ostracism, social boycott and stigma
210. See GANGOLI, supra note 182, at 111.
211. See Khan, supra note 12, at 156-57; see also MAHMOOD, supra note 55, at
115-17; M. Fazlul Haq, Polygamy in Islam: Misrepresented and Ill-judged, in
MODERN INDIAN FAMILY LAW, supra note 12, at 180, 180-84. There seems to be a
common thread that polygamy has a beneficial effect on society by preventing
adultery and prostitution. However, no data are presented to support this claim.
A point of further study would be to gather data on the incidence of adultery and
prostitution in polygamous societies. On another note, the role of women as
providers of sexual services in a range of contexts from marriage to prostitution is
missing in these analyses.
212. See generally PARASHAR, supranote 9.
213. See GANGOLI, supra note 182, at 111.
214. Deepali Gaur Singh, Bigamy, Conversion and Women's Rights in India,
RH REALITY CHECK (Oct. 5, 2009, 6:00 AM), http://www.rhrealitycheck.org/blog/
2009/10/05fbigamy-conversion-and-womens-rights-in-india.
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continuing to live within such a legally tenuous alliance,
this was the protection that the courts were offering.2 1 5
It should be noted here that the economic constraints that
might have prompted women to enter bigamous marriages are
2 16
placed in direct opposition to the interests of the first wife.
The result is that the first wife is cast as a double victim,
entirely innocent, while the second wife is both a victim and a
perpetrator. That victimization can be very real, but this
conception is complicated when some degree of choice is
involved.2 1 7
Even in the Mormon context, women activists in the 1800s
had a difficult time deploying victimization narratives when
women's actual choices and constraints made them less than
entirely innocent. A woman's choice to be the second or third
wife of a rich man who provided financial support instead of
being the sole wife of a pauper immediately cast doubt on her
moral integrity if her choice could not be explained through
victimization.
Nevertheless, as feminists argue, choices are necessarily
constrained by economic and social factors. At the heart of
these tensions are questions of identity and politics. What is a
defensible feminist position on polygamy? Can women who
assert that their religious identity is as important as their
gender truly be feminists? Can polygamy be defended as a sexpositive choice, and under what conditions? And even if one is
anti-polygamy, does that necessarily translate to support for
state regulation through criminal law? These are vexed
questions to which no easy answers are available. What can be
said while we grapple with these questions is that holding to
the construction of polygamy as a backward, necessarily
subordinating practice that ought to be abolished prevents
feminists from working to "normalize" it and making it more
just. As a result, polygamy is pushed into the closet and is
allowed to retain its gender subordinating practices without
intervention and advancement.

215. Id.
216. Id. In any polygamous family with dependent wives and children, the
resources that go to support one wife would necessarily diminish the resources
available to other wives. As such, wives are in competition with each other over
resources.
217. See Kumari v. Singh, A.I.R. 1990 H.P. 77 (India) (discussing a woman who
petitioned the court to allow her husband to marry a second wife).
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Religious Accommodation and Abolition

In the United States and India, both the state and elites
have consistently looked down on polygamy for moral reasons.
As discussed in Part II, in the United States the moral
disapprobation coupled with political fears of Mormon strength
resulted in an aggressive effort to abolish the practice. As
Oman has shown, it was part of an imperial, assimilationist
agenda. 2 18 The types of interventions made by the U.S.
government at both the state and federal level are in keeping
with the overall structure of secularism (infused at that time
with Protestant Christianity). Secularism elevates similarity
over difference and seeks to create a more uniform political and
social citizenry. Debates about multiculturalism are a late
arrival on the scene.
By contrast, India has not dictated a particular family
form but has allowed variation across religious and cultural
groups. 2 19 India, too, has undertaken legal reform abolishing
polygamy, but not uniformly. The legislature, finding that the
practice was not an essential part of Hinduism, abolished it for
the Hindu community, thereby assimilating all Hindus under a
particular view of Hinduism. 220 However, because it is a family
form explicitly recognized in the Qur'an, the Muslim holy book,
the legislature could not make a similar claim that it was not
an essential part of Islam. Thus, Indian statutory personal
laws remain moored to religious laws. 22 1
Reynolds and Narasu Appa Mali (and the cases that follow
these decisions) have obvious commonalities. The Indian courts
often comparatively cite U.S. cases, and in Narasu Appa Mali
the Bombay court borrowed the distinction made between
belief and practice and found that the former is protected but
not necessarily the latter. 222 The judiciaries both share a legal
system rooted in the English tradition and are deeply

218. See Oman, supra note 115, at 665-67 and accompanying discussion on
federal regulation of polygamy.
219. See SOLANKI, supra note 178, at 66.
220. See State v. Narasu Appa Mali, A.I.R. 1952 Bom. 84, 4 (India).
221. The Quran 4:3 (Trans. M.H. Shakir) (alterations in original) (footnotes
omitted) states:
If you fear that you will not deal fairly with orphan girls, you may marry
whichever [other] women seem good to you, two, three, or four. If you
fear that you cannot be equitable [to them], then marry only one, or your
slave(s): that is more likely to make you avoid bias.
222. NarasuAppa Mali, A.I.R. 1952, 1 5.
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influenced by Liberal jurisprudence. 223 The bench and bar in
both countries are comprised of the elite and reflect this
similarity.2 2 4
It is not surprising therefore to find a similar disdain for
"'regressive" practices like polygamy and a view that modernity
demands that they be abandoned. At heart, these normative
positions comprise a sense of what are "truly" Hindu or
American (historically conflated with Protestant Christian)
norms. There is also a shared sense that social reform or public
policy are both important governmental interests that might
override religious practice, particularly when it is the very
practice that is the target of reform.
On the other hand, there are important divergences. First,
India's polygamy ban binds the majority community, but leaves
the minority community's practice untouched. For the Indian
courts, moreover, the concern is not preservation of traditional
values-the typical inquiry in any fundamental right claim in
the United States-but reform. 2 25 The way that the courts have
rationalized the criminalization of bigamy for Hindus is
through the explicit conclusion that polygamy is not essential
to Hinduism and that marriage is different for Hindus, a
contract.226
These
are
rather
than
a
sacrament

223. Liberal philosophy has had an impact on the very notions of progress and
modernity. As described above, monogamy is part of the progress/modernity
narrative, and therefore it is not surprising that polygamy would be treated as a
vestige of premodernity. For an excellent discussion of Liberalism and progress
narratives, see UDAY SINGH MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE: A STUDY IN

NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH LIBERAL THOUGHT (1999).
224. See, e.g., V.R. Krishna lyer, Op-Ed., Against Abuse of the Contempt Power,
HINDU (July 24, 2010) http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-edlarticle530271.ece
("Indian judges belong to an elite class like their English counterparts, and can be
relieved only by impeachment which is a political operation beyond the pragmatic
capabilities of the masses."). Justice lyer served on the Supreme Court of India
from 1973 to 1980. Hon'ble Mr. Justice VR. Krishna Iyer, SUP. CT. INDIA,
http://www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in/judges/bio/vrkrishnaiyer.htm (last visited
Mar. 11, 2012).
225. See, e.g., NarasuAppa Mali, A.I.R. 1952, 1 11.
226. Id.
5-6. The Chief Justice reluctantly engaged in this analysis:
It is only with very considerable hesitation that I would like to speak
about Hindu religion, but it is rather difficult [to] accept the proposition
that polygamy is an integral part of Hindu religion. It is perfectly true
that Hindu religion recognizes the necessity of a son for religious efficacy
and spiritual salvation. That same religion also recognizes the
institution of adoption. Therefore, the Hindu religion provides for the
continuation of the line of a Hindu male within the frame work of
monogamy.
Id. 6.
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pronouncements on religious doctrine. This kind of religious
analysis is absent in U.S. courts. Such religious inquiry now
would certainly run afoul of the entanglement prong of the
Lemon test.2 27
Second, with regard to the minority Muslims, while the
High Court of Bombay reasons that the Muslim community

may not be ready for such reform, there is an underlying view
that the Indian Constitution acknowledges a plural society, not
a uniform one. 22 8 In other words, the Indian Constitution
recognizes the reality of legal pluralism and attempts to
balance the tension of such pluralism with uniformity. That
approach tends to restrain the impulse to discipline and

assimilate difference.
Despite the different legal treatment of polygamy for
Hindu and Muslim communities, a more detailed study of the
on-the-ground realities reveals that family forms overlap
between the two communities. This is true in part because of

the heterogeneity often missed by those looking purely at the
formal legal system. 229 Both the legal tolerance for difference
and a sense of inclusiveness have allowed Muslims to retain a

group identity in the face of majoritarian pressures, sheltering
them from the kind of regulation faced by Mormons. India's
227. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
228. See NarasuAppa Mali, A.I.R. 1952, T 22. Justice Gajedragadkar writes:
Article 41 of the Constitution is, in my opinion very important in dealing
with this question. This article says that the State shall endeavour to
secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of
India. In other words, this article by necessary implication recognises the
existence of different codes applicable to the Hindus and Mahomedans in
matters of personal law and permits their continuance until the State
succeeds in its endeavour to secure for all the citizens a uniform civil
code. The personal laws prevailing in this country owe their origin to
scriptural texts. In several respects their provisions are mixed up with
and are based on considerations of religion and culture; so that the task
of evolving a uniform civil code applicable to the different communities of
this country is not very easy. The framers of the Constitution were fully
conscious of these difficulties and so they deliberately refrained from
interfering with the provisions of the personal laws at this stage but laid
down a directive principle that the endeavour [must] hereafter be to
secure a uniform civil code throughout [the] territory of India. It is not
difficult to imagine that some of the members of the Constituent
Assembly may have felt impatient to achieve this ideal immediately; but
as Article 44 shows this impatience was tempered by considerations of
practical difficulties in the way[.] That is why the Constitution contents
itself with laying down the directive principle in this article.
Id.
229. See SOLANKI, supra note 178, at 66-68.
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secularism, which is avowedly accommodationist, is not
offended by the existence of different laws for different groups
even while aspiring to uniformity. As the Andhra High Court

held in Sambireddy v. Jayamma:
Article 14 of the Constitution assures to all persons equality
before the law and equal protection of the laws. It is now
well settled that while Article 14 forbids class legislation, it
does not forbid a reasonable classification for the purposes
of legislation, provided that the classification is founded on
an intelligible differentia and that differentia has a rational
relation to the object of the statute. 2 30
Social and religious values differ and may be deeply held,
and in India there is room for such difference in the legal
framework. The Reynolds decision, on the other hand, was part
of an impetus to forcibly reform the minority Mormon
community. The impetus in the U.S. courts today is to tolerate
private difference, but the morality of Protestantism is so
infused in the common law that it continues to color our
notions of what is truly "normal., 2 3 1 Thus, the different
approaches adopted by the two countries reflect different
secular frameworks.
Among the similarities and differences between the United
States and India, there is one factual similarity that is of
particular interest. In the United States, between thirty to fifty
thousand people live in poly amous households, and that
number continues to increase.239 This increase is in spite of the
230. See Sambireddy v. Jayamma, A.I.R. 1972 A.P. 156, 3 (India). This is in
keeping with India's understanding of positive discrimination or affirmative
action, which has on occasion resulted in serious civil unrest. However, the idea
that substantive equality is as much a value as formal equality is firmly rooted in
India's constitutional framework. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sex
Equality Under the Constitution of India: Problems, Prospects, and "Personal
Laws,"4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 181 (2006).

231. It is difficult to clarify the framework of Protestant secularism that has
become normalized in the United States. See generally TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS
OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY (2003).

232. Polygamy in America, PUB. RADIO INT'L (Feb. 12, 2010), http://
www.pri.org/stories/politics-society/polygamy-in-americal873.html;
see
also
Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Some Muslims in U.S. Quietly Engage in Polygamy,
NAT'L PUB. RADIO (May 27, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=90857818; Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Philly's Black Muslims
Increasingly Turn to Polygamy, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (May 28, 2008), http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90886407&ps=rs. For those who
might argue that this is an indicator that the law is working to deter polygamy, it
might be noted that this is an unprovable counterfactual. We do not know

1014

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO IAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

criminal ban and the states' appetite for prosecution. In India,
the incidence of polygamy is almost the same for both Hindus
and Muslims-approximately five to seven percent-in spite of
the threat of criminal prosecution for Hindus. 23 3 The inference
is that formal bans are insufficient to abolish the practice and
that tolerance for the practice does not necessarily mean an
increase in it.
Moreover, it calls into question the deterrent value of the
law. If Muslims and Hindus practice polygamy in equal
numbers, is there any validity to the claim that the
criminalization is having a deterrent effect? In fact, some
Hindu communities still consider polygam licit, while some
Muslim communities have prohibited it. 34 In the United
States, polygamous communities continue to defy the bans.
Further, informal polygamy continues to grow, making the law
only a deterrent to formal polygamy. Analogously, in the
United States, there are increasing numbers of people in the
majority community who are not Mormons with multiple
sexual partners and children from those unions, resulting in a
sort of de facto polygamy that, because of the lack of
enforcement of fornication and adultery laws, goes largely
unregulated.2 3 5 Despite legal bans, the actual formation of
polygamous families occurs. 23 6 These local norms are often

whether polygamy would become socially widespread if it were allowed. Arguably,
it was never particularly widespread even in its heyday in the 1800s.
233. 1 FLAVIA AGNES, FAMILY LAW: FAMILY LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CLAIMS 164 n.143 (2011).
234. See SOLANKI, supra note 178, at 64 n.21.
235. See sources cited supra note 232; see also Adrien Katherine Wing,
Polygamy from Southern Africa to Black Britannia to Black America: Global
Critical Race Feminism as Legal Reform for the Twenty-First Century, 11 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 811, 857 (2001); Melissa J. Mitchell, Comment, Cleaning
Out the Closet: Using Sunset Provisions to Clean Up Cluttered Criminal Codes, 54
EMORY L.J. 1671, 1676 (2005).
236. See Wing, supra note 235, at 854-62; see also Pauline Bartolone, For
These Muslims, Polygamy Is an Option, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 5, 2007),
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f-/c/a/2007/08/05/INTBR80JC1.DTL&
ao=all; Polygamy in America, supra note 232. In contrast to the perception that
polygamy is always a burden for women, one of the wives interviewed by
Bartolone provides an alternative perception of polygamy:
"We get our time off, we got a sisterhood thing going on," chuckles Asiila,
50, Ali's wife of 15 years. She crosses her ankles underneath her
overhead khimar, a black dress that covers her from head to toe. "To me,
polygyny (polygamy) is for the woman. It's really for the woman."
Bartolone, supra (alteration in original). Given that one of the reasons forwarded
for the limited support for the practice of polygamy in Islam was a shortage of
men as marital partners, the following observation is intriguing:
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more germane than state, national, or centralized laws. 23 7 The
reality is that polygamy continues to be a part of the family
landscape in both countries with or without formal recognition
in the law. In the concluding section below, I suggest that
feminists and the state take a more nuanced approach to
polygamy, one that focuses on the economic power distribution
within the family. I briefly examine some ways in which we can
redirect our efforts to changing polygamy's effects on women
instead of pushing for more enforcement through criminal law.

IV.

REDIRECTING OUR EFFORTS AT CHANGING POLYGAMY'S
LIVED CONSEQUENCES

At first glance, the treatment of polygamy for Hindu
Indians and for Americans would seem quite similar or
equivalent. In both countries, a formal criminal prohibition
punishes bigamy with prison sentences and a fine. Yet
polygamy still continues in India and the United States, and it
may be growing. 23 8 The lessons of both India and the United
States should make us skeptical about attempts at formal
uniformity and criminalization to achieve the goal of gender
justice. A concentration of efforts on elimination through
prosecution does little to change the lived experiences of
women who are part of polygamous families. The feminist
critique of polygamy continues to be important. From a
feminist perspective, polygamy as it currently stands is not an
optimal choice regardless of its legality. 2 39 Thus, any proposal
that seeks to decriminalize the practice cannot discount the
very real gender disparities that exist in polygamous families
and the vulnerability of women in such families. Even where
women choose to become part of polygamous marriages,
"Most African American women who are into polygyny do so by
choice," says [associate professor and chairwoman of philosophy and
religious studies at Beloit College Debra Mubashir] Majeed, adding that
their reasons range from their interpretation of the Quran, to desire for
independence, to needing a father for their children.
She says that a shortage of marriageable Black Muslim men may be
one reason polygamy is embraced.
"With the high number of African American men in prison, on drugs,
out of work, or unavailable in some other way . . . the options are

limited," Majeed said.
Id. (second alteration in original).
237. See SOLANKI, supra note 178, at 68.
238. See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
239. See generally HASAN & MENON, supra note 177.
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without an adequate understanding of the circumstances, we
cannot accept those choices as wholly unconstrained. In this
Part, I briefly examine the distributive consequences of
polygamy and suggest some reforms of family property laws
that might begin to change the internal economy of polygamous
families. In turn, I argue that these reforms will improve the
lives of women who engage in polygamy. Such reforms would
be beneficial even if we remain skeptical about women's choices
with regard to entering into plural marriages.
As noted by feminists, polygamy as it has been
traditionally practiced in various cultures continues to reflect a
stereotypical sexual division of labor (male breadwinner/female
bread-maker) that economically disadvantages women. 24 0 Age
disparities between husband and wives tend to exacerbate
these gender inequalities. 24 1 And concerns about consent to
enter into a polygamous union in traditional polygamous
societies, particularly if marriages are undertaken at young
ages, are quite salient.242 Polygamous marriage, which has
perhaps seen less reform because of non-recognition or light
regulation, is open to a number of critiques that have driven
beneficial reform of monogamous marriage. 24 3 While feminists
have championed criminal responses to the ills of domestic
violence, a greater reform effort has focused on the economic
distribution of marital property.244 The result has been more
equality in monogamous marriages and an advancement in the
status of women. 5
Regarding the use of state criminal law to end violence in
marriage, this approach has yielded some positive results.
However, a robust critique of law enforcement's focus on plural
240. See generally KATHLEEN GERSON, THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: COMING
OF AGE IN A NEW ERA OF GENDER, WORK, AND FAMILY (2011); ARLIE R.
HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT (1997); Theodore N. Greenstein, Economic

Dependence, Gender, and the Division of Labor in the Home: A Replication and
Extension, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 322 (2000).
241. See ZEITZEN, supra note 204, at 125.
242. See generally Cheryl Hanna, Rethinking Consent in a Big Love Way, 17
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 111 (2010).

243. See sources cited supra note 240.
244. For examples of recent scholarship surveying the criminal justice
responses, see GOODMARK, supra note 192; Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on
Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741 (2007). For discussions of reform of laws that have an
impact on the distribution of property in marriage, see Margaret Mahoney,
Economic Sharing During Marriage:Equal Protection, Spousal Support and the
Doctrine of Necessaries, 22 J. FAM. L. 221 (1984); J. Thomas Oldham, Changes in
the Economic Consequences of Divorces, 1958-2008, 42 FAM. L.Q. 419 (2008).
245. See Mahoney, supra note 244; Oldham, supra note 244.
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marriage has been underway in the United States for nearly a
decade. 4 6 Such critiques have focused on the fact that
stringent criminal enforcement has produced its own dark side
by disincentivizing dependent women from seeking state help,
which has increased incarceration and had disparate effects on
minority communities. It is timely, therefore, to reconsider
criminal approaches to plural marriage, which may produce
similar problems. Many women in India, for instance, do not
support their husbands taking multiple wives, but this does not
mean that they are willing to turn their spouses in to the
authorities for criminal prosecution. 24 7 As the High Court of
Bombay acknowledged in Narasu Appa Mali, most Hindu
wives would not come forward to prosecute their husbands.2 4 8
Criminal prosecution does not necessarily translate into the
kind of economic and social security that might open up more
palatable choices for women. Reform is more likely to be
accomplished through social change and changes in the laws
affecting women's economic well-being.
In this Part, I explore some alternative legal approaches.
Rather than concentrating our efforts on stricter enforcement,
we would better serve women by changing property and
inheritance laws to be more equitable for partners in marriage
regardless of the form of their family. In this regard, the Indian
judiciary's nuanced approach to recognition of families
regardless of the formalities can be instructive for the United
States. Moreover, family law reform in the United States
providing for more equitable distributions of marital property
may be similarly instructive for India.
The Indian judiciary has come to recognize the gap
between formal legal regulation and the substantive reality of
the persistence of plural marriages and its attendant problems.
As a result, the similarities between India and the United
States are only surface deep. While the United States has given
no quarter to polygamists, the Indian judiciary has taken a
much more nuanced if somewhat inconsistent approach. It
tends to categorize polygamy cases into two types, both of
which involve husbands disavowing the marriage; in the first
type of cases, they do so to try to avoid being jailed or fined,
and, in the second, they do so to avoid paying maintenance to
wives.
246.
247.
248.

See sources cited supra note 244.
See State v. Narasu Appa Mali, A.I.R. 1952 Bom. 84 (India).
Id. T 11.
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As Warner Menski opines, with regard to the first type of
cases, the judiciary has been very lenient toward polygamous
Hindu men when faced with prosecuting them for violating the
bigamy ban. 249 This is so even when a first wife is actively
attempting to have her husband put behind bars.2 5 0 The
prevalent argument is based on the decision by the Indian

Supreme Court in Bhurao Shanker Lokhande v. State of
Maharashtra, in which the Court declined to find a legal
marriage because all the re~uisite ceremonies of a Hindu
marriage were not performed.
On the other hand, another trend has emerged in which
second wives who are vulnerable to disinheritance have
received a measure of protection from the courts. In these
cases, second wives have found a much more sympathetic court
willing to distribute property to them and their children. 2 52
While this approach results in inconsistent outcomes at least
with regard to the enforcement of polygamy, it also creates
some tension between first and second wives. But it does not
result in the complete disinheritance of a second wife.
Moreover, there is truth to the claim that such a soft approach
to enforcement fails to send any kind of message to willful
violators who slip through the loophole by neglecting some
ceremonies in the marriage formalities. 2 53 The approach is far
from perfect. Yet, it recognizes a reality: Polygamy is a family
form that is here to stay.
In the United States, the courts have preferred to deal
more consistently with polygamous marriages, even going so
far as recognizing and criminalizing substantive but informal
marriages. 4 This is so even in the face of decisions that
presumably call into question the criminal bans against adult
249. See MENSKI, supra note 137, at 394.
250. See, e.g., Ghosh v. Ghosh, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1153 (India) (finding a second
marriage invalid and acquitting the husband, even over the vigorous objection of
the wife and her active participation in his prosecution).
251. Lokhande v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1564 (India). The
court found that without the ceremonies of homa and saptapadi involving the
circumambulation of the holy fire, there could be no legal marriage. Of course,
this ignores the forms of marriage that are normative in India. In other words,
there is no singular, orthodox form of marriage. See e.g., In re Dolgonti Raghava
Reddy, A.I.R. 1968 A.P. 116 (India) (holding that, in the Telengana Reddy
community, a marriage without these rituals would still be valid).
252. See MENSKI, supra note 137, at 402 (citing Devi v. Choudhary, A.I.R. 1985
S.C. 765 (India) (holding that various forms of customary marriages were valid
when faced with a complaint by the second wife seeking maintenance)).
253. Id. at 410.
254. See, e.g., State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726 (Utah 2006).
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consensual sexual behavior. But a move to formally
decriminalize polygamy does not appear on the horizon even
after Lawrence v. Texas. In other words, the criminal laws
prohibiting polygamy are likely here to stay alongside de facto
polygamy. So, the question must be how to regulate and where
to best make interventions. The choice of intervention is, of
course, determined by the position that one takes toward
polygamy.
In this Article, I have tried to show how moral disapproval
leading to aggressive pursuit of polygamists in U.S. history has
had limited success in eradicating the practice. Nevertheless,
there is still an appetite for strong criminal prosecution. 25 5
India's case is far more mixed in reality, with social approval
varying, judicial enforcement inconsistent, and formal bans
firmly in place. 2 56 If one takes the view that polygamy is a
social evil, it may follow that the most logical intervention is a
more aggressive enforcement of criminal laws and harsher
punishments. But, I would argue that such a position is
inconsistent with the trend of greater choice in family
formation and a view that adult polygamous unions, freely and
consensually entered into, should not be criminalized by the
state. From this position, my primary concern then would be to
ensure that parties are treated fairly within the economy of the
family and that the law's distributive effects are just.
While different forms of family and sexual freedom
of heterosexual monogamy,
challenge the supremacy
particularly in the United States, polygamy is an ancient form
of marriage. 2 57 It has historically been organized in the
breadwinner/bread-maker model, with women being dependent
on their husbands, exchanging the duty to obey for support.258
However, there is no reason to suppose that the effects of the
internal hierarchy cannot be influenced in ways beneficial to its
constituents. Such intervention would have to take into
255.

See id.; see also State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820 (Utah 2004).

256.

See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.

257. See Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)
("[Tihere is arguably a stronger foundation for challenging statutes prohibiting
polygamy than statutes limiting marriage to members of the opposite sex
'because, unlike gay marriage, [polygamy] has been and still is condoned by many
religions and societies.'" (quoting George W. Dent., Jr., The Defense of Traditional
Marriage, 15 J.L. & POL. 581, 628 (1999)) (second alteration made by the court).

258. See Carrie A. Miles, "What's Love Got to Do With It?"- Earthly Experience
of Celestial Marriage, Past and Present, in MODERN POLYGAMY IN THE UNITED
STATES: HISTORICAL, CULTURAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES 185, 187-89 (Cardell K.
Jacobson & Lara Burton eds., 2011).
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account the legal and social contexts in which decisions to enter
a polygamous marriage are made. And they would not cover
those marriages in which fraud or deceit procured the consent
of partners to enter into the marriage, such as nondisclosure of
a prior marriage. 259
As a general matter, women may be better served with
laws that ensure that their choices-even when constrainedare valued. Instead of treating women as either morally
corrupt for choosing polygamy or victims of it, the law might be
morally agnostic.2 0 Such a stance would look to protect
women's rights to marital property and economic support (it
might assume that agency is present, but that is not
necessary). Although India's judiciary has protected the rights
of the second wife in a plural marriage in the absence of
legislation, the marital property regime in general requires
reform in order to protect all wives from disinheritance. By
contrast, in the United States, marital property reform has
been successful; however, with regard to polygamous
marriages, these reforms exclude second or third wives because
of the illegality of the relationship and because the wives

259. Fraud that goes to the essentials in monogamous marriages is grounds for
voiding the union, and this should not be changed, as it invalidates consent. See,
e.g., ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 30, at 152-54; see also In re Marriage of Meagher
31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 663 (Ct. App. 2005) (finding that lying about wealth does not
amount to fraud as to the essentials of the marriage); Summers v. Renz, No.
H024460, 2004 WL 2384845 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2004) (holding that even
discovery of a husband's prior attempted murder of his previous wife by shooting
her while she slept did not amount to fraud as to the essentials of the marriage).
260. The question of choice is quite vexed. See generally KENT GREENFIELD,
THE MYTH OF CHOICE: PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN A WORLD OF LIMITS (2011);
ROSEMARY HUNTER & SHARON COWAN, CHOICE AND CONSENT: FEMINIST
ENGAGEMENTS WITH LAW AND SUBJECTIVITY (2007). Feminist differences about

what "valid" choices women may make has led to a charge and countercharge of
"false consciousness." There is no means by which to judge whether a choice is
"good" for a woman without entering into normative judgments about what is a
"good life." Liberal feminists have articulated a particular view of womanhood
that elevates individuality and equality over dependence, interconnectedness, and
complementarity. While I agree that the idea of separate spheres has been used
historically to deny women entry into traditionally male spheres and that any
claims based on this notion should be vigorously examined, I am reluctant to
assert that all women who choose particular forms of existence that are more
"traditional" are falsely conscious and "in reality" are actually unhappy or
oppressed. This reluctance comes from a recognition that choices that are
constrained by external factors (such as a lack of alternative better choices) may
nevertheless be rational. Take for instance the choice to partner in a polygamous
union and to bear children with a shared father rather than to remain single and
childless or to raise children as a single parent. What would be a "good" choice
under these circumstances? See Bartolone, supra note 236.
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knowingly enter into the relationship. 2 6 1 Knowledge then bars
them from using equitable remedies like the putative wife
doctrine discussed below.
In either country, a property regime that does not penalize
women for consensually entering polygamous marriages and
that allows them a fair share of the marital assets would
ensure that one wife does not pay because she came second in
time regardless of the understanding of the members of the
family. To this end, a first step in the Indian context would be
to reform the prevalent title theory of property and recognize
marital property. The current property regime in India follows
the largely discarded title regime in the United States.26 This
has meant that husbands that accumulate property and title it
in their own names are deemed the separate owner of the
property regardless of whether it was obtained with marital
assets.2 6 3 Clearly, this divests many women of a share of the
assets even when their own assets were used to purchase the
new property. 26 4 Such a change would preserve rights in
marital property to the wives of both Hindu and Muslim
polygamous men, disincentivizing them from discarding their
first, often older, wives in favor of a second wife.26 5 In other
words, the state should take the "treat them equally"
admonition seriously and make it clear that a man will not
escape his financial responsibilities by repudiating a first wife
or taking a second wife only to disregard the first. Moreover, it
is not enough to force a husband to give alimony to his ex-wife
because maintenance is often paltry and contingent on the
willingness of a husband to continue to pay.2 66 Wives must
have a right to a share of marital property at divorce or death,
which will give them some measure of security.
As a corollary to reforming marital property law, it is also
important to protect the property that women bring into the
marriage. The possibility that a wife's assets will be controlled

261.

See ABRAMS ETAL., supra note 30, at 150.

262.

See Kamala

Sankaran,

Family, Work and Matrimonial Property:

Implications for Women and Children, in REDEFINING FAMILY LAW IN INDIA 258,

261-75 (Archana Parashar & Amita Dhanda eds., 2008); see also ABRAMS ET AL.,
supra note 30, at 469-70.
263. See BINA AGARWAL, A FIELD OF ONE'S OWN: GENDER AND LAND RIGHTS IN
SOUTH ASIA 199, 292-315 (1994).
264. Id.

265.
266.

Sankaran, supra note 262, at 259-66.
See id. at 265-66.
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by the husband is quite real.267 As such, it is important to be
able to separately protect dower assets unless there is consent
to make such property marital. Further, polygamous families
may have a division of labor that is quite different from that of
monogamous families. The law needs to be sensitive to valuing
the contribution of the various members to the family's overall
wealth. Work such as childcare and housework must be taken
into account. Many of these reforms have already happened in
the United States and have benefitted women's autonomy in
the family.
Since the 1980s, family courts in the United States have
taken the division of labor into consideration and attempted to
value marital contributions in monogamous marriages, even if
their methods were inadequate. 268 Moreover, they have also
had to determine property rights with regard to unmarried
cohabitants. Given that the United States is unlikely to pull
back from its long-held criminalization stance to recognize
plural "marriage," the remedies available to unmarried
cohabitants are the most promising in securing rights for
plural wives.
These remedies fall into contract and equity. Contractual
remedies like those used in Marvin v. Marvin, a seminal case
in the field of cohabitation, require some form of contract
between the parties. 269 However, some courts have required a
"marriage-like" relationship to accompany the contract. 70 This
requirement is reflected in the American Law Institute's
Principles, which define domestic partners as "two persons of
the same or opposite sex, not married to one another."271
Although not widely followed, the principles enshrine the
dyadic nature of "marriage-like" relationships even while

267.

See BIPASHA BARUAH, WOMEN AND PROPERTY IN URBAN INDIA 104-38

(2010). For an example of this in the Muslim community, see Gregory C.
Kozlowski, Muslim Women and the Control of Property in North India, in WOMEN
AND SOcIAL REFORM IN MODERN INDIA: A READER 326 (Sumit Sarkar & Tanika
Sarkar. eds., 2008).
268. See, e.g., Pratt v. Pratt, 475 S.E.2d 102 (W. Va. 1996). See generally
Penelope E. Bryan, Reasking the Woman Question at Divorce, 75 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 713 (2000); Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Propertiesof Marriage, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 75 (2004).
269. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976); see also A.L.I.,
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03(1) (2002) (defining domestic partners as two people of
the same or opposite sex who have shared life as a couple).
270. See, e.g., Devaney v. L'Esperance, 949 A.2d 743 (N.J. 2008).
271. A.L.I., supra note 269, § 6,03.
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moving toward acceptance of same-sex unions.2 2 It is,
therefore, likely that contract remedies will be foreclosed
unless this definitional hurdle is overcome.
Equitable doctrines are similarly unavailable. The putative
spouse doctrine requires proof that the remedy-seeking party
did not know of the prior existing marriage. 2 73 In order to make
the doctrine work for plural marital partners, the "innocence"
or "knowledge" requirement would need to be removed. Then,
courts can recognize the injustice of allowing a spouse to retain
all the marital property simply because the partners were
aware that a valid marriage already existed and nevertheless
chose to enter into a plural family, much in the way they do for
monogamous putative spouses. In effect, this change would
diminish the distinction between valid and invalid marriages.
However, the change is not overly concerning because the
bigamy statutes would still punish those who entered into a
bigamous marriage while perhaps protecting substantive
marriages that are plural. In the absence of decriminalization,
this would be an intermediate step.
As is evident, without reform, in both Indian and U.S.
contexts, a second marriage is void ab initio, leaving second
spouses with few rights if they knowingly entered into the
marriage.274 The Indian courts have preserved the rights of
second families by recognizing a substantive marriage in cases
involving Hindus who marry bigamously, but the courts are not
uniform in their application. Further, this is effectively a
judicial end run around the statute that voids second
marriages. 275 Nevertheless, the formal law prohibiting
recognition of bigamous marriages is not a categorical bar to
recovery of some property.

272. See generally ROBIN FRETWELL WILSON, RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY:
CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION (2006).
273. The "putative spouse doctrine" requires that an "innocent spouse has
relied in good faith on a mistaken belief in the validity of the marriage." ABRAMS
ET AL., supra note 30, at 172.
274. See Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, No. 25, Acts of Parliament, 1955, § 11
(India); see also ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 30, at 150; SOLANKI, supra note 178, at
109-10.
275. See MENSKI, supra note 137, at 404 ("[Dlespite the legislative prohibition
of Hindu polygamy, the courts have continued to take a rather lenient approach
towards polygamous Hindu men when it comes to protecting them against
criminal convictions. But the courts are not lenient when financial claims of
women and children are at stake.").
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Comparatively, in the United States, a similar
acknowledgment that cohabitation may occur in more forms
than the dyadic one would bring plural marriages-and other
forms of family already existing and growing-under the
protection of the law. 276 Already, some scholars have suggested
alternative ways to construct marriages that borrow from other
areas of the law. New approaches that move away from
marriage as status towards marriage as contract, for instance,
might consider a consensual polygamous marriage as a multiparty partnership (though this analogy has its limits).277 The
economic distribution of marital assets then would be different
than in a status-based construction where marital partners'
rights to property are based on different ideas of obligation. 278
Current law that forces plural relationships into the
monogamous straitjacket is unlikely to do justice to all
members of a polygamous family. 279
CONCLUSION
Polygamy as a practice is unlikely to vanish. It is a family
form that has survived into modernity. Instead of trying to find
ways to eradicate it because it is "barbaric" or medieval, a more
realistic approach would be to treat polygamy like a modern
phenomenon and to use our tools to change it. Criminalization
has proved to be a blunt instrument in this regard, and moral
disapprobation seems a flimsy rationale for continuing on that
path. A jail sentence for a polygamous husband results in the
deprivation of the breadwinner in most traditionally structured
polygamous families. 280 In the Unites States, perhaps this is
less problematic given the existence of a social safety net and
the ability of wives to rely upon the state to support their
children to some extent. Nevertheless, the negative economic
276. See Emens, supra note 205, at 361-75.
277. See Davis, supra note 15, at 2002-24.
278. See Barbara A. Atwood, Marital Contracts and the Meaning of Marriage,
54 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 22-34 (2012).
279. For instance, the legal rule that a second marriage is void ab initio
regardless of its length makes it difficult for second wives to sue for marital
property. See, e.g., ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 30, at 141.
280. In India, bigamy is punishable by fine or imprisonment of up to seven
years. In the United States, state laws govern the crime, which is usually a felony
offense. See INDIA PEN. CODE (1860), ch. XX, § 494. In Utah, it may result in a
five-year jail term. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101 (2003); see also Criminal
CTS.,
http://www.utcourts.gov/howto/criminallaw
ST.
Penalties, UTAH
penalties.asp (last modified Aug. 11, 2011).
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impact of divorce on women has been well-established, 2 8 1 and

this would be even worse given that no support would be
forthcoming from a jailed spouse. Moreover, incarceration
occurs not because the husband poses a threat to his family or
to the state but because of moral repugnance for polygamy. We
have moved away from prosecuting fornication, adultery, and
homosexual sex, yet we continue to criminalize plural
marriages. In this Article, I have argued that we ought to be
more interested in accommodation and recognition of adult,
consensual arrangements of family. The state can continue to
regulate the family by making changes to marital rights and
obligations of the constituents of any marriage in order to make
marriage more just for the partners. In both India and the
United States, this form of intervention offers more options for
maximizing the liberties of all families while protecting
important political and social values.

281. See STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE REALLY ARE: COMING TO TERMS
WITH AMERICA'S CHANGING FAMILIES 123 (1998).
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